The reliable (and programmable) digital electronics were originally developed for ICBMs in the 60s, and only after quite a bit of miniaturization were they available for smaller guided missiles, meaning that there wasn't quite as much institutional experience of software engineering among guided missile designers as you'd think.
I think it did amazing job in the 90s against the arguably most technically advanced and innovative military, even more so considering it was pushed past its original specs.
To my eyes, this is a classic training issue. Either the men on the ground were never told to reboot, or they were never told the consequences of failing to do so. Whether that failure was on the manufacturer's part for making crap manuals, or on the Army's part for screwing up the training, I don't know.
Fatal errors are almost never a single thing going wrong unpredictably - they're a chain of events leading to an inexorable conclusion. Root cause - where were these guys?
It is possible to get this right: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_Dart_missile#Gulf_War_.2819...