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Re:GrayKey iPhone unlocker poses serious security concerns by dheera on Saturday March 17, 2018 @02:43AM (#16605863)
Time delays only provide a false sense of security. In theory I could always cut open the casing and just plug wires straight into the EMMC or whatever you have in there. Your time delay UI is useless if I just bypass your UI and wire straight into the hardware.

Of course that's non-trivial EE work, but the point is it's possible, for someone with enough money and the right equipment. What would make it intractable is to ditch the idea that a 4 digit pin is protecting you from anything. There's simply not enough entropy in that.

Time delays are useful protection when over a network. But not when the attacker has physical console access, e.g. to a phone. At that point proper cryptography and mathematics is the only good protection.

Re:GrayKey iPhone unlocker poses serious security concerns by jrockway on Saturday March 17, 2018 @03:19AM (#16605930)
I mean, I don't think they're dumb enough to put unencrypted data out on busses that you can just probe. All the encryption is done inside the same package as the CPU; if you read the RAM or flash directly, you'll just get garbage because it's encrypted.

https://www.arm.com/products/security-on-arm/trustzone is the generic version of this, no idea what exactly Apple is doing.

Anyway, to break the encryption involves finding bugs in the software that runs in the secure zone (the same way you'd defeat a time delay in a networked application) or by opening up the CPU die and figuring it out with an electron microscope (perhaps while the CPU is running).

Ultimately, software is going to be the productive attack vector. While the TrustZone docs emphasize "small" for the amount of code that runs in the secure zone, no programmer can ever do "small" on a deadline and so I wouldn't trust it to provide any actual security. But the hardware infrastructure is there to be pretty secure against any adversary that doesn't have a lot of time or money, if the programmers do their job correctly. (I don't trust it because of the time schedules involved for these SoCs. One or two a year, with a lifetime of maybe a couple years. Nobody is going to spend the money to do the hard work like looking for bugs just so that someone can't rip Netflix video feeds. The engineering work would be more expensive than whatever their contract with the DRM vendors says they have to pay if they get hacked, which is the only incentive to be secure... and I doubt Apple would sign one of those.

Re:GrayKey iPhone unlocker poses serious security concerns by abalone on Saturday March 17, 2018 @03:57AM (#16606000)
You misunderstand the SEP. It contains an externally unreadable private key baked in at manufacturing time that encrypts protected data. Your "wires" would read garbage. The iOS security white paper is worth a read.

Perhaps a nation-state actor could shave down the processor and read that key with a SEM or some crazy thing, but that's literally how far the design is supposed to have pushed iOS security. Which is what makes this hack so embarrassingly bad (if confirmed).

Re:GrayKey iPhone unlocker poses serious security concerns by bufferoverflow on Saturday March 17, 2018 @04:49AM (#16606084)
SEMs are not that expensive. The cheap ones on eBay are $12-14K. The more expensive Chinese ones are closer to $200K.

A security company can easily afford either.

Re:GrayKey iPhone unlocker poses serious security concerns by matthewmacleod on Saturday March 17, 2018 @04:56AM (#16606104)
I don't think the acquisition of a SEM is the barrier to performing this kind of attack. It's still extremely hard
Re:GrayKey iPhone unlocker poses serious security concerns by abalone on Saturday March 17, 2018 @08:48PM (#16609931)
I think I read somewhere that some secure coprocessors incorporate physical defenses that will destroy keys if you try to shave them down or physically tamper. So yeah. Hard.
Re:GrayKey iPhone unlocker poses serious security concerns by whyenot on Saturday March 17, 2018 @02:37PM (#16608343)
Getting a SEM would be the easy part. The hard part would be sample preparation and interpreting the results.
Re:GrayKey iPhone unlocker poses serious security concerns by dheera on Saturday March 17, 2018 @04:18PM (#16608861)
> Perhaps a nation-state actor could shave down the processor and read that key with a SEM or some crazy thing, but that's literally how far the design is supposed to have pushed iOS security. Which is what makes this hack so embarrassingly bad (if confirmed).

Shaving down the processor is hard but still possible. A government with a billion-dollar budget can probably do it, if they want, including after practicing on a million throwaway phones in the process. Apple's design is also known as security by obscurity (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_through_obscurity).

I much prefer an open design and security by high-entropy keys and well-established practices in the cryptography. I'd feel much safer using open cryptography libraries and strong passwords than arbitrarily and blindly trusting some secretive engineers at Apple.

Apple's design is super-hard to break but possible. My Linux laptop, on the other hand -- the hard drive is standard SATA. Have at it. I don't care if you have a billion dollars, you'll have a hard time breaking into my data for a probably at least a few decades.

Re:GrayKey iPhone unlocker poses serious security concerns by abalone on Saturday March 17, 2018 @09:00PM (#16609970)
That is just totally false. Apple does not rely on security through obscurity. They may not publish the code for the SEP but they do have a whitepaper that lays out the key architectural features.[1]

The only reason your Linux laptop would be more secure than an iPhone is if you were using a high-entropy key to unlock it every time you wanted to use it -- and the iPhone wasn't. That's it. But remembering high entropy keys without storing them in some less secure manner is so inconvenient and failure-prone for most people that it's actually a less secure design than Apple's SEP-assisted approach. And you could opt-in to a high entropy key on an iPhone if you wanted to, so even that is a false comparison.

[1] https://images.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pd...

Re:GrayKey iPhone unlocker poses serious security concerns by greglindahl on Saturday March 17, 2018 @03:22AM (#16605937)
One of the points of having a secure enclave is that it can enforce things like time delays. I doubt that the time delay in question is only enforced by the UI outside the enclave.