The progressive^2 pricing model is interesting though. It's a little legally complex unfortunately so we have to look into it, but I also like the aspect of the idea where the less you make as a student, the more a lower percentage could help you live more comfortably.
Thanks to a focus on software and automation where we can afford it without hurting the experience, it's been good enough so far where we haven't noticed this affecting our decision making yet.
Another point: the cost per student does not increase linearly with time. Instead, advising becomes significantly more efficient after we've already taught the student our core insights. This means we're much more willing to spend additional time on students the more time we've already spent.
In contrast, houses can't "learn" how to sell themselves like a student can, so real estate agent costs are linear with time spent.
I'd love to see a concept like this work but it is very difficult to truly align the incentives between recruiters and candidates or companies. Like you said it's just like real estate, a turnover game where the broker doesn't really care about optimal outcomes for the transacting parties.
That said this could still add a lot of value for students - I certainly had no clue about career paths when I was in school. So I hope they figure out a way to make it work for everyone.
For most people (that tech companies/professional companies want to hire), they already have the skills needed to market themselves.
Outcomes from job seeking fall on a spectrum from underemployed to dream job and our goal is to help get you an outcome that's at least 7% better than what you would've got on your own.
As for the risk of trying to sell quickly rather than looking for quality, I think the most effective way we can tackle it is by also measuring the student's satisfaction with their final offer.
One of the most important things to protect a student here as well is they don't have to accept any offer they're not happy with. They can reject an offer to look for more and we don't have any say to stop them.
Whenever we do run into a situation like this where our advice may be affected by a conflict of interest, we also do our best to inform the student first. Something like, "Pathrise will make money if you accept this offer, so please take what I say with a grain of salt, but..." and then we'll just have an honest conversation about what they're looking for and if the offer is a fit.
You guys doing very little gets you 7k.
You guys putting forth significant effort gets you 7.7k.
That's not much difference and it makes a lot more sense for you to put that extra effort into finding another customer to get another 7k.
With this logic, I think you can look at the income share agreement more as us taking on the risk rather than aligned incentives.
The problem with some potentially good career coaching services out there is that charging students thousands of dollars upfront without actually having placed them yet just feels unfair.
On the other hand, with income sharing, students know we have a similar risk of getting nothing out of the experience as they do, which motivates us to make their experience as impactful as possible.
Even if we continue at an extremely high rate of placements, let's say 95%+, for the other 5% of students where the worst case happens, the income share agreement model is much better than upfront payment because the cost of these invested advising hours and resources is on us rather than on the student.
Outside of that, I think from a purely revenue perspective you're basically right that the incentive to invest a lot of time for a little salary is not incentivized.
Part of the reason why we are still incentivized to put effort into our students (especially if we can track measurable results) is that those results will ultimately lead to much better user acquisition anyways, especially since we expect natural referrals for Pathrise to be one of our main sources of growth moving forward.
I do have to admit though, that though this is a very real incentive core to our business, it isn't an incentive that's actually integrated into the revenue model itself.
There is a chance here for both the student and Pathrise to benefit from working together, but the social interaction (and understanding that students sometimes make life-choices that they later regret) must be navigated with a deft touch.
An up-front payment for Pathrise's services, assuming that they work, would appear to avoid any future sadness; the student could finance the interaction with an outside financier. Coupling the financing directly to the service may cast an unwarranted shadow upon an effective job-placement service.
One of the ways we handle this now is we actually ask the students to consult their family before signing anything. We also allow the students to still drop out of the program at no liability within the first two weeks.
The problem with upfront payment is that we are no longer held accountable by aligned incentives. The most predatory thing about student loans is that you still owe the same amount of money regardless of your outcome. I think our income share agreement is designed to be much safer since in almost every case where you pay anything you are also capable of paying it.
For students in exceptional situations, we'll even waive their dues or retro-actively offer financial aid since we didn't design the program to be a future burden. The way we see it, helping out a student in need in any way pays back tenfold in terms of reputation later.
As in, if it was a loan for only $1000, it's certainly more ok to do less qualification. Versus if you were saddling a student with a loan of $40,000, you should probably be very careful.
If you sign up all students and do nothing further, you still get your 7%. That is not aligned.
To align incentives you would have to align the students payments with how much you improved their outcomes - much harder to do of course.
I think your model has the same risks as real estate commissions where the selling agent is highly motivated to sell quickly and they have little motivation to get a higher price.