I think what the paper actually shows is \exists message M, s.t. \forall decontaminating functions F, F does not decontaminate M.
In fact, we know the title (as I interpreted it) is false - the paper gives an example of a message that can be read as plain text which can be truly decontaminated.
Basically, when we get a message, we'll be able to immediately tell whether we can decontaminate it or not. If not, the paper argues we're doomed because eventually it'll leak. I just don't find that to be very interesting, and definitely not as strong a claim as the title (as I interpreted it).
I don't think this is true (at least not "immediately").
The paper is arguing that we will need computers to help decode any non-trivial message, and any computer program capable of decoding a non-trivial message will be Turing complete, and hence capable of running virus code that could have damaging or destructive effects. (The paper's example was a message containing equations in LaTeX, which is Turing complete, hence an ETI could embed a virus in LaTeX code, and humans might not be able to spot it.)
The strategy the paper is advocating, as far as I can see, is that, unless the message is simple enough that humans can decode it without computer help, and thereby check directly whether it contains any dangerous information, the message should be destroyed. I suppose this could count as "we can't tell whether we can decontaminate it", but I'm not sure that's what you meant.
Edit: If we were incredibly paranoid and had some self-sacrificing astronauts it could be a one-way trip to Mercury.
Just speculating, without knowing how we could get to such a predicament.
2. How would you identify that what you've created is an AI?
3. Under what circumstances would you decide to trust the AI that you've created?
4. Under what circumstances would you be confident to feed a potentially malicious potential AI to your trusted AI?
But more to the point, who knows what it can convince the astronaut to do? Can it convince the astronaut to transmit a hostile message back to Earth, suborning the receiving computer, and thereby letting the AI out of the box?
In the AI alignment field, this is called the "value drift" problem.
I may have been unclear: the astronaut is never intended to leave the box, he burns with the box. The astronaut is paralyzed save for his tapping finger, and on a doomed one way trip.
It's certainly possible, but negotiations with hidden agendas have been part and parcel of humanity for all time, and are a major basis for all foreign (and most internal) affairs.
The paper presents no predicament that China couldn't put the US in tomorrow with a suitably (apparently) one-sided deal, and yet countries don't as a rule isolate themselves to avoid hearing potentially deadly trade offers.
That's because you're assuming that whatever ETI or AI we are bargaining with has roughly our intelligence. That is what has made it possible for humans to negotiate with each other instead of isolating themselves to avoid hearing potentially deadly offers.
But any ETI or AI capable of sending us a complex message will probably be much more intelligent than we are. In that case, we would basically be in the same position as, say, a dog trying to negotiate with humans; we simply would not even be able to comprehend what the other side was doing or thinking.
If I were negotiating with an alien intelligence, I would assume that it could think circles around me, so I wouldn't be about to accept any bargain that I couldn't - fully - think through the ramifications of. I'm not going to accept complicated bargains, only extremely simple ones. This would most probably result in making no bargains at all. So be it.
I reject the notion that a being capable of reason, holding all the cards, is unable to create an unwinnable state for its opponent, when inaction is a possibility. The most intelligent computer in the universe can't beat you at chess if you don't play.
Any sufficiently advanced alien invasion could be indistinguishable from local politics.
I think the paper fails because it assumes a magical hypersmart AI would arrive as a message at a radio telescope.
But if you’re going to magically assume a magical hypersmart AI, you may as well assume it can get here magically without being noticed.
I'm just jumping off from the particular assumption that the paper makes.
If this is true for you, it's also true for the AI. Which would be a contradiction, similar to the old classic irresistible force meeting immovable object. So the notion you're rejecting is the only consistent possibility.
Firstly, we begin with a power imbalance, we're not on a level playing field.
Secondly, there's nothing inconsistent about both parties being able to create an unwinnable state for the other. As I stated earlier in my comment, the most likely outcome is no dealing whatsoever. The only rational alternative is an agreement whose effects we can both perfectly foresee.
"Assume" is a bit of an odd way of putting it. The paper is a discussion of the risks of receiving a certain type of message.
> but the paper presents no proof whatsoever that "message decontamination is impossible."
That's a bit harsh. The paper provides several arguments which I find quite solid. Which of them did you find unconvincing? The existence of message that can't be parsed by hand? The risk of manipulative AI running on an air-gapped computer? The difficulty of containing a message given that we can't turn off the source? The difficulty of containing knowledge/information over longer time scales?
I didn't think there was much particularly new in that article. It's mostly a re-hashing of other people's arguments. The most interesting point the article made is this conclusion:
"As we realize that some message types are potentially dangerous, we can adapt our own peaceful transmissions accordingly. We should certainly not transmit any code. Instead, a plain text encyclopedia (Heidmann 1993), images, music etc. in a simple format are adequate. No advanced computer should be required to decrypt our message."