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Re:How not to run a CA by aiCeivi9 on Thursday March 01, 2018 @10:21AM (#16492649)
"Trustico allows customers to generate a Certificate Signing Request and Private Key during the ordering process," the statement read. "These Private Keys are stored in cold storage, for the purpose of revocation."

Maybe they decided preparing CSR is too hard for their clients :/

Re:How not to run a CA by BuildTheRobots on Thursday March 01, 2018 @10:47AM (#16492860)
Lots of companies used to allow this, GlobalSign being one of the biggest that jumps to mind (iirc they stopped it in the last couple of months).

The idea that the company would store the private keys, however, is even more troubling.

Re:How not to run a CA by u801e on Thursday March 01, 2018 @11:48AM (#16493584)
> Maybe they decided preparing CSR is too hard for their clients :/

It seems that a lot of businesses and people feel that making things "easier and more convenient" takes priority over best security practices. For example, we can't support client side TLS cert authentication (in addition to a username and password) because customers won't be able to generate the CSR or know how to import the certificate into their client. Instead, let's use SMS or email based two factor authentication.

Re:How not to run a CA by recursive on Thursday March 01, 2018 @12:12PM (#16493875)
And they're probably not wrong. In other words, I suspect that if there were two identical competing services, the convenient one would win. If one only supported client certs, and one only supported 2FA, I have a (unsupported) feeling that the client cert company would not survive long.
Re:How not to run a CA by jis on Thursday March 01, 2018 @04:49PM (#16496708)
Yep. The problem is that most customers cannot judge the level of security offered by a company. So Company "A" says they are "secure," but has a cumbersome process to follow to get a certificate. Company "B" says they are "secure" and has a convenient process. Guess which one gets the business (all else being equal).

In reality Company "B" may well be much less secure then "A", but the customer has no way of knowing that or making a judgement on which company is more secure.

Re:How not to run a CA by HelloNurse on Friday March 02, 2018 @08:33AM (#16501204)
On the other hand, a customer who doesn't realize that their private key should never leave their premises has no business asking for a certificate. It's like not selling guns to children.
Re:How not to run a CA by u801e on Friday March 02, 2018 @09:53AM (#16501791)
While that may be true, that doesn't mean the rest of us shouldn't have the option of using certificate based authentication.
Re:How not to run a CA by HelloNurse on Friday March 02, 2018 @12:52PM (#16503932)
We have the option of using certificates, but not the option of giving away private keys.
Re:How not to run a CA by u801e on Thursday March 01, 2018 @06:51PM (#16497504)
Could a company offer both options? That is, a customer could choose whether to use a client certificate or SMS message/email based 2FA.
Re:How not to run a CA by chedabob on Thursday March 01, 2018 @12:15PM (#16493910)
I don't understand why they'd need the Private Keys for revocation. Isn't one of the reasons to revoke because you've lost the private key?
Re:How not to run a CA by edaemon on Thursday March 01, 2018 @01:08PM (#16494485)
You don't need the private keys for revocation, and you're right that compromise of the private key is one of the best reasons to revoke a cert.

I can't figure out why the Trustico CEO emailed the private keys to DigiCert. It doesn't make sense.

Re:How not to run a CA by wcoenen on Thursday March 01, 2018 @04:36PM (#16496600)
The Trustico CEO intentionally compromised the private keys to force DigiCert to revoke the certificates. DigiCert wouldn't do this otherwise on his request; it's the actual owner of the certificate who needs to request revocation.
Re:How not to run a CA by edaemon on Thursday March 01, 2018 @04:53PM (#16496736)
I meant I don't get why he would want to do that. Why insist that all of his customers' keys be revoked? Why intentionally compromise the keys to make that happen?

After reading more about it, though, I think it's less that it doesn't make sense and more that the person making these decisions is incompetent.

Re:How not to run a CA by MertsA on Friday March 02, 2018 @08:33AM (#16501208)
In fairness, all of those private keys were already compromised from the start. I have no clue why the CEO decided to take such harmful action to his own company, but one way or another all of those certificates needed to be reissued.