Or all the clouds might have 'evolved' a few minutes ago to comort with some new apple policy. This is all about trusting a corporation. I still prefer to handle my own encryption, keeping my keys how and where i like.
Matthew Green is a capable cryptographer who engages with the wider security community and practical encryption a lot (e.g. https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2016/03/21/attack-o... if you're interested in this kind of thing, I'd recommend following him more closely (e.g. on Twitter.)
Mentioned here: https://9to5mac.com/2016/02/25/apple-working-on-stronger-icl...
The question is, if you trust that iOS and iCloud work the way Apple says they do (under oath), how vulnerable are they to an adversarial cloud. They have designed a system to keep your keychain safe under these conditions.
HSM is a term used exclusively for server hardware, I believe. I know Apple devices (and some Android) use secure enclaves, but I don't believe they are referred to as "HSM"s.
I agree Apple does well in the security arena, but they should do more to prevent software updates without erasing the device if the security key is not available.
That was the part I was arguing with. Apple can get the keys if they were compelled to.
If Apple has access to the data, the government can compel them to turn it over. The whole point of this setup is that Apple doesn't have access to the data, because they can't get the keys, and they can't reconfigure the HSM to give it to them.
Now yes, they could in theory change iOS and push out an update to everyone that breaks the security model. But the government¹ can't compel them to do that. The government cannot compel them to materially change their product and break one of the major advertised features of the device.
¹I'm assuming US government here. The rules would be different in China, but I guess China knows that even they can't compel Apple to break the security model of the device in this way, Apple would rather leave China than do it.
>With one major exception — iCloud Keychain, which I’ll discuss below — iCloud fails the mud puddle test. That’s because most Apple files are not end-to-end encrypted.
The blog post is saying that iCloud backups are not protect from Apple, except keychain backups. So your files, messages, etc are not protected from Apple. And the video you posted seems to only be about keychain backups.
Sounds like the author missed Apple's BlackHat 2016 talk. It goes into lots of technical detail on Cloud Key Vault.[1] Well worth watching -- and a very cool implementation of a secure backup system designed for "adversarial clouds".
It's pretty cool how it retains end-to-end encryption of your keychain while also backing it up to untrusted clouds. Basically it employs Hardware Security Modules that limit recovery attempts to 10 tries before destroying the data, thus protecting against backend brute forcing and allowing you to use your relatively weak device passcode to encrypt the backup. And here's the kicker -- they put the HSM firmware signing keys in a blender so even an adversarial government can't force them to modify them.
Update: I guess he did watch the video (he previously wrote a whole post on it). So I'm not sure what he thinks is missing, or maybe I misunderstood and he's only complaining about non-keychain data encryption.
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BLGFriOKz6U&feature=youtu.be...