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Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by abalone on Friday February 23, 2018 @07:33PM (#16450850)
> Where Apple provides overwhelming detail about their best security systems (file encryption, iOS, iMessage), they provide distressingly little technical detail about the weaker links like iCloud encryption.

Sounds like the author missed Apple's BlackHat 2016 talk. It goes into lots of technical detail on Cloud Key Vault.[1] Well worth watching -- and a very cool implementation of a secure backup system designed for "adversarial clouds".

It's pretty cool how it retains end-to-end encryption of your keychain while also backing it up to untrusted clouds. Basically it employs Hardware Security Modules that limit recovery attempts to 10 tries before destroying the data, thus protecting against backend brute forcing and allowing you to use your relatively weak device passcode to encrypt the backup. And here's the kicker -- they put the HSM firmware signing keys in a blender so even an adversarial government can't force them to modify them.

Update: I guess he did watch the video (he previously wrote a whole post on it). So I'm not sure what he thinks is missing, or maybe I misunderstood and he's only complaining about non-keychain data encryption.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BLGFriOKz6U&feature=youtu.be...

Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by kodablah on Friday February 23, 2018 @09:40PM (#16451323)
I think the author is looking for written documentation and reference material, not a presentation that may be outdated and not apply to this situation. I concur with the author, this should be available in clear unambiguous docs. Instead, many are unfortunately forced to point to old videos and depositions as reference material.
Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by abalone on Saturday February 24, 2018 @12:37AM (#16451901)
August 2016 is not that old, it clearly applies to this situation (“adversarial clouds”), and also the salient points are documented in the iOS security white paper which is updated annually: https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by sandworm101 on Saturday February 24, 2018 @06:03AM (#16452747)
And why should we assume that every cloud is the same? The china cloud might be different in tiny but important ways.

Or all the clouds might have 'evolved' a few minutes ago to comort with some new apple policy. This is all about trusting a corporation. I still prefer to handle my own encryption, keeping my keys how and where i like.

Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by abalone on Saturday February 24, 2018 @11:54AM (#16454081)
Nobody is assuming that. The whole point is it can store secrets on adversarial clouds. The key stays with the client.
Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by JoachimSchipper on Saturday February 24, 2018 @03:13AM (#16452300)
The author, in fact, has specifically written an article on the talk you mention: https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2016/08/13/is-apple....

Matthew Green is a capable cryptographer who engages with the wider security community and practical encryption a lot (e.g. https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2016/03/21/attack-o... if you're interested in this kind of thing, I'd recommend following him more closely (e.g. on Twitter.)

Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by ec109685 on Friday February 23, 2018 @10:59PM (#16451577)
Apple still could release a software update that would update the HSM firmware to remove the limit of ten tries before the keys are lost.

Mentioned here: https://9to5mac.com/2016/02/25/apple-working-on-stronger-icl...

Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by eridius on Friday February 23, 2018 @11:38PM (#16451695)
You're confusing the behavior of the device with the behavior of the HSM modules used for iCloud storage.
Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by abalone on Saturday February 24, 2018 @12:31AM (#16451884)
eridius is right. Apple cannot update the firmware of the backend HSM clusters without data loss. (If you believe what they say.) They literally throw the signing keys into a blender. The article refers to device firmware not the iCloud backend.
Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by ec109685 on Saturday February 24, 2018 @01:26AM (#16452049)
Yeah, I got confused by HSM and Secure Enclave. I still think it is crackable given it is all secured by a user’s pin which can be verified on device by software Apple controls.
Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by abalone on Saturday February 24, 2018 @02:12AM (#16452174)
Of course Apple controls the software. Apple or any manufacturer could push an update overnight that disables all encryption and transmits your data to Donald Trump or whoever they want the next time you enter your passcode. There’s exactly zero “security researcher insight” in observing that.

The question is, if you trust that iOS and iCloud work the way Apple says they do (under oath), how vulnerable are they to an adversarial cloud. They have designed a system to keep your keychain safe under these conditions.

Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by ec109685 on Saturday February 24, 2018 @02:42AM (#16452231)
Agree they aren’t vulnerable to a rogue cloud for keychain data.
Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by ec109685 on Saturday February 24, 2018 @01:25AM (#16452045)
The attack is that you force Apple to update the OS for a person’s device w/ evil firmware. Then you crack the device by guessing the pin in a brute force manner. Then you unlock the data from the HSM with that guessed pin.
Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by niij on Saturday February 24, 2018 @01:47AM (#16452111)
The conversation is about recovery of data stored off-device e.g.: on Apple's servers. There wasn't a discussion about recovery of information when the physical device is present.

HSM is a term used exclusively for server hardware, I believe. I know Apple devices (and some Android) use secure enclaves, but I don't believe they are referred to as "HSM"s.

Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by ec109685 on Saturday February 24, 2018 @02:35AM (#16452219)
I know. I conflated HSM and Secure Enclave incorrectly.

I agree Apple does well in the security arena, but they should do more to prevent software updates without erasing the device if the security key is not available.

Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by ec109685 on Saturday February 24, 2018 @03:03AM (#16452282)
Also, the article stated this: “In short: Apple has designed a key vault that even they can’t be forced to open. Only customers can get their own keys.”

That was the part I was arguing with. Apple can get the keys if they were compelled to.

Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by eridius on Monday February 26, 2018 @07:11PM (#16470137)
But they can't be compelled to.

If Apple has access to the data, the government can compel them to turn it over. The whole point of this setup is that Apple doesn't have access to the data, because they can't get the keys, and they can't reconfigure the HSM to give it to them.

Now yes, they could in theory change iOS and push out an update to everyone that breaks the security model. But the government¹ can't compel them to do that. The government cannot compel them to materially change their product and break one of the major advertised features of the device.

¹I'm assuming US government here. The rules would be different in China, but I guess China knows that even they can't compel Apple to break the security model of the device in this way, Apple would rather leave China than do it.

Re:Apple in China: who holds the keys? by Buge on Saturday February 24, 2018 @04:26AM (#16452494)
This is covered in the blog post:

>With one major exception — iCloud Keychain, which I’ll discuss below — iCloud fails the mud puddle test. That’s because most Apple files are not end-to-end encrypted.

The blog post is saying that iCloud backups are not protect from Apple, except keychain backups. So your files, messages, etc are not protected from Apple. And the video you posted seems to only be about keychain backups.