A tiny dedicated computer like Tomu[0] that fits into your computer, that provides authentication (and similar cryptographic functionality), with inpedentent input (touch) to receive manual ACKs and output (led) to provide feedback, with no other functionality, is a cheap, reasonably safe, and convenient solution. Maybe unlock it on boot (and after timeout) with a password/PIN for good measure.
Currently I'm using Chrome backed by KWallet backed by PGP key on a YubiKey 4. Upon launching Chrome I have to authenticate with/touch the Yubikey to unlock my session, which is spiffy, but after that seemingly random pages (even in an incognito window) will prompt Chrome to unlock my keychain. The Yubikey will flash, indicating something wants access to it, but I have no indication of what that something is. If I ignore the flashing, eventually a KWallet window pops up complaining about being unable to use the GPG key.
Chrome shouldn't access your credentials without telling you what it's used for. Chrome shouldn't expose cryptographic identities in incognito mode. The Yubikey's output is vague.
What can we learn from that?
Chrome has shortcomings in this domain. Just one monochrome LED is maybe not enough output to give reasonable feedback.
My online banking security system is called chipTAN and uses a small, monochrome, low-res display to give essential information for what is being processed which I need to acknowledge. That works well, but is also a single-purpose solution.
For identification on the internet, a solution based on GPG seems reasonable. Imagine a small display that shows the receiver you are identifiying to, the identity you are using, and for how long the identification is valid, and then you can acknowledge that.
And even then, malware can still just steal your cookies.
[1] https://www.fidusinfosec.com/fslabs-flight-simulation-labs-d...
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Protection_Directive#Prin...
In that scenario, the user has committed copyright infringement (i.e. it can/should result in a civil claim and a fine). If what is claimed has happened (the company used the passwords retrieved from pirates' computers to access private websites of those pirates), then the company employees who took and used their passwords have committed a crime (i.e. it can/should result in arrests and jail time). Many of the things that police can and will do in an investigation are crimes if you do try to do it yourself. The fact that your target seems to have committed a crime doesn't justify crimes against them; and they are innocent until proven guilty.
Those acts aren't comparable; what the company seems to have done is on a much higher level of illegality than software copyright infringement.
Unfortunately for me, things don't work that way. For most of Europe at least, you'd be perfectly justified in treating my 100 page EULA like the garbage it is and basically ignore everything in it that isn't already prescribed by law anyway.
I am not familiar with the flight sim license in question, but there are a number of general terms it might contain that would allow for the collection behavior. Telemetry, anti-piracy, anti-cheat, audit, fitness of purpose, and many other provisions could cover this particular behavior.
Further, if their claims are to be believed, they only initiated this action against a someone in already in breach of contract, so the law isn't going to protect the pirate anyway.
Again, I think the company's behavior is unethical - they should have contacted law enforcement. But illegal? That is not at all clear.
But just repeating a part in many contracts is enough to make a court say that it is not individually negotiated and is therefore treated differently (AGB in German).
A seemingly endless text wall with non-negotiabile terms that is considered agreed to by a click on "I have read this and agree to it" might only be binding to very limited extent, if at all.
In my contract I mentioned a part was considered invalid because it was an issue that cannot be agreed to in an AGB, and the part was considered to be sufficiently AGB-like.
To give another scenario, someone offers me a proprietary software. I don't know the terms and condition but I know that I need to pay for it. I then pay and receive the software. Upon starting it, it presents me with terms and conditions I need to agree to. In this scenario, the terms and conditions in the software are entirely void because the contract was established when the software was exchanged for money and the terms were not agreed to at that point. Only what is agreed to when the contract was established counts. If the software doesn't work for the intended purpose, I am free to modify it such that it does.
Parts in a contract can be void even if agreed by both sides.
I mean, the apology seems legit and it's not that likely that anyone will press charges, but it still is a quite stupid risk that they've taken. In many cases "hack-back" may seem a practical alternative, but it's not, because it tends to be absolutely illegal (well, perhaps not if you're in NSA or something). Hopefully this case will be sufficient warning for others.
It sounds like they distributed a tool that goes through your Chrome saved passwords database and if the installer thinks you're a pirate, it sends credentials from that database back to the author. The author is now saying they used credentials they learned from this to break into a private website to learn more about how their DRM was being bypassed.
This seems so incredibly illegal, I can't believe they admitted that this is what they're doing.