Preliminary testing shows that I was able to write there with out any problem. No way for me to read it at the moment though...
Edit: As noted by another user here, yes, it is writeable. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16367722
The windows filesystem has more than a dozen specific permissions, similar to advanced acl on Linux, that allows very fine grained permissions.
This allows to have shared folders where users can do anything, except delete the directory itself or modify files created by other users.
It’s also possible that when Skype’s updater creates the folder it has different ACLs.
That's inaccurate. UAC makes it appear like you can, if you try to do this as an unprivileged user on a default install it will fail.
Plus even if you could create C:\Temp, you'd need to add it to the system-scoped environmental variable PATH for it to be searched for libraries. If you could do that you've already effectively escalated without this.
This Skype issue exists because they're running a SYSTEM level process from a directory a normal user owns.
I too cannot access C:\Windows\Temp at all without escalating permissions. Neither can I write to anything in C:\Windows as described in the original source without escalated permissions.
I'm a little puzzled about what would stop someone with the same permissions from doing exactly the same thing with the fully qualified name.
Preliminary testing shows that I was able to write there with out any problem. No way for me to read it at the moment though...
Edit: As noted by another user here, yes, it is writeable. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16367722
> An unprivileged (local) user who is able to place UXTheme.dll or any of the other DLLs loaded by the vulnerable executable in %SystemRoot%\Temp\ gains escalation of privilege to the SYSTEM account.
On my machine at least an unprivileged user does not have access to %SystemRoot%\Temp\ so it seems to be a case of what Raymond Chen refers to as "on the other side of the airtight hatchway".