Re:Advanced Denanonymization through Strava
by gmueckl on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @03:29AM
(#16263765)
Even the knowledge of exact guard patrol routes and possibly even timings inside a known military base can be extremely helpful information for someone planning an attack. Best part: you don't even have to place a scout in physical proximity as preparation and risk discovery. So this is less than ideal for military organizations.
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Re:Advanced Denanonymization through Strava
by stef25 on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @03:38AM
(#16263791)
You're totally right of course and I think it's pretty shocking that military personnel aren't aware they are broadcasting their location out to the web. Complete opsec failure.
Re:Advanced Denanonymization through Strava
by fapjacks on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @04:03PM
(#16268996)
They are, they just don't care. The State Dept will likely issue a ban on their facilities which personnel will adhere to. Other military installations like Special Forces bases or regular Army bases overseas probably will issue a memorandum ("Be Vigilant!"), but I predict they won't stop using the devices. State Department facilities are the only places that they try to hide from others. Not that people and equipment are operating out of them (because that's impossible), but that they are State Department facilities to begin with.
Re:Advanced Denanonymization through Strava
by mxfh on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @03:42AM
(#16263806)
These are most most certainly not patrol routes, but routes taken by people in their off duty time or in mandatory fitness time.
Re:Advanced Denanonymization through Strava
by gmueckl on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @03:53AM
(#16263855)
Well, a route taken regularly at 3 am is almost certainly not someone taking an off duty stroll. I do not know if you can readily figure that out from the data available through Strava. But if you can, this is bad.
Re:Advanced Denanonymization through Strava
by mxfh on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @04:01AM
(#16263883)
How can you be so sure?
Patrol shifts are normally rotated to prevent exactly that among other reasons, while someone having a regular non-patrol late shift (or early) and doing his exercise regularly at 3 am is also not unheard of.
Re:Advanced Denanonymization through Strava
by gmueckl on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @04:29AM
(#16264000)
I did do some guard duty. The bases I was at were dead silent in the middle of the night.
Re:Advanced Denanonymization through Strava
by matthewowen on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @11:23AM
(#16266514)
You might be able to, but even then it is more likely to be a person doing exercise on a device with the wrong time zone than it is to be someone on patrol.
To reiterate: Strava isn't always on. These are activities people have actively chosen to log. The chance of it being someone out on patrol is... not high.
Re:Advanced Denanonymization through Strava
by gmueckl on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @11:33AM
(#16266605)
Having to actively log the data is interesting. I agree with your conclusion there.
However, GPS is primarily a very high precision time signal, from which the current location is reconstructed. Basically, a properly designed software would do the proper time zone adjustment based on that, so the data should ideally be in local time everywhere without exception. Everything else would be a bug in my book.
Re:Advanced Denanonymization through Strava
by matthewowen on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @11:44PM
(#16271390)
OK, but that isn't how these devices work.
Source: I've used lots of them and it's a real pain in the ass.