Edit: in other words, when you say:
> The mistake in this line of thinking is in the tacit assumption that a quantum system possesses a certain property prior to or independent from a measurement. It does not.
You are only asserting that's the case, not defending it. The rest of your post operates on the opposite, undefended assumption that a quantum system does not possess a certain property prior to or independent from a measurement.
But the whole point of the alternative interpretation I pointed out is a way of reconciling the observations with an essentially classical world (at least in the sense that there is a single objective reality which exists independent of observation)—do you see a way in which it fails to do that? My understanding is that considering the probabilistic aspect of the theory to be modeling our knowledge of the system instead, successfully accounts for the fundamentally 'non-classical' observations.
It just seems hasty to throw out such a seemingly well-supported hypothesis (single objective reality independent of viewer), if there are two effective interpretations, one of which conflicts with it, the other of which does not. From my reading, the primary reasons for the mainstream physics community having adopted the stance which competes with the 'objective reality' hypothesis (i.e. Many Worlds or Copenhagen interpretations), are historical accident and political, while the intrinsic merits of the alternatives are near equivalent.
If we're going to play that game, I'll choose spooky action at a distance anyday, and say that space is just a strong correlation MOST of the time, but doesn't have to be ALL the time. I wonder how much classical baggage YOU bring by thinking Bell's inequality disproves something because nonlocal interactions are not possible.
What's easier to imagine - correlations between particles far away or many universes which are not actually real in any sense you can define?
Many universes of course. At least that doesn't mess up with the workings and casuality of this universe.
How is this any different than the multiverse theory as a non-explanation to the fine tuning? You simply push the problem elsewhere.
Just because it predicts outcomes (probabilistically!) very accurately doesn't mean we have the full picture.
(how does gravity fit into this picture? it's completely let out of QM!)
Your comment is wrong. In the 3rd of the 3 interpretations of QM (Debroglie Bohm) this is exactly the case. The world is at all times in a well defined state. We just don't know it until we measure so we use probabilities to desceibe. All 3 QM interpretations are mathematically indistinguishable.
But any property we can measure is not well-defined, in the sense that before we have actually measured it, it doesn't exist.
Note "our" knowledge there. If I am making a measurement, and you are disconnected to me, how and when does it become our knowledge? How is it that one human measuring results in a collapse, with no other human knowing about it. Does something more happen when this first human tells about it to others?
That's counter to a century of experiments and theories. If that was the case, QM would be a trivial classical theory.
In that case, our knowledge allows for more possibilities before making a measurement (observation), and collapses into something more definite after the measurement.
That's probably not the best description, but I think the basic idea about modeling knowledge makes a lot of sense. Eddington was primarily a physicist, but also a philosopher. I read this account of his in 'The Philosophy of Physical Science.'
If I'm not mistaken, it's pretty much in line with the 'Pilot Wave' interpretation which is getting more attention these days.