Better to (a) ship your code with explicit version and content dependencies (e.g. a SHA-256 of the package you expect to exist), or (b) delegate trust in upstream packages to fewer, more well-vetted, authorities (i.e. distro-style).
Package signing I can't tell if it's a good idea or not. It would require you to accept a new key in this case, but that is going to happen super frequently with NPM, inducing alert fatigue, and it doesn't do anything to prevent the authors' publishing credentials getting stolen.
e.g. philipwhiuk/gnome moves to gnome/core and there's a version published to philipwhiuk/gnome that pulls in gnome/core
1. only packages > nK downloads 2. only packages with tests 3. only packages with publicly available code that is same that I am downloading 4. only packages with > nnn stars, forks, issues, pull requests
All are just proxies for being a valid node in a dependency graph.
And like to know if any transitive dep violates my inclusion rules.
I don't know how you gain any kind of critical mass trying to compete against a well-established registry like npmjs, though.