Moreover, even in the '90s, when people actually did stuff like attaching solsniff to the SprintNet backbone, being passive equated to being active, because the passive vantage point gives you TCP sequence numbers, which is all you need to hijack a connection from across the Internet.
Your browser already does the thing you're asking for with regards to SSL. Just click through the warnings, which are telling you "encryption without authentication offers very little security, but if you're sure, go ahead and pretend it's doing something for you".
The biggest attackers by far are the NSA and similar agencies -- that's passive attack -- scanning your emails, VOIP calls, browsing habits, etc.
Sound familiar? It should, ssh(1) does this by default.
Why would anyone accept this weakness with their bank account? My mom barely understands the lock icon.
If I ssh to a new box at home, then go to Usenix and ssh warns me that the host key changed I'll have protected against MitM attacks, even if the original connection wasn't authenticated.
It doesn't work at Internet scale. It's too insecure. It's very unlikely that key continuity is going to replace PKI in HTTPS.
Do I have strong opinions about PKI vs. key continuity? No. All I'm saying is that it's not a panacea. SSH-style key continuity is not the global solution for the certificate warning Firefox is annoying you with.
You realize that Firefox already does this, right? Just hit "add exception" when the dialog pops up. Look! It works just like SSH!
"3 of your friends have said that they trust this
certificate from Amazon.com. Do you want to accept it?"also, perhaps i skipped over this, but tcpcrypt seems like a level of encryption well below application, thus if we did get a hijacker trying to 'change the self signed cert' after an initial connection (or just dropping the encryption) we wouldn't know, unlike ssl/browsers. am i incorrect?
I really would like to see a better handling for this in the case of https as well. I want a way to see a mechanism that a site can offer to provide passive communication protection but where the site does not guarantee its identity, thus meaning it's possible for a MitM attack if you're willing to accept that risk.