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Re:Tcpcrypt by djcapelis on Tuesday August 17, 2010 @12:17AM (#1610243)
Arguably, the right way of doing it is to use both. PKI to auth first connect, remember the chain to prevent bad CAs from giving certs people pretending to be BoA.
Re:Tcpcrypt by pyre on Tuesday August 17, 2010 @01:31AM (#1610353)
Why not abandon central key authorities and go distributed? Bring social networks and the web-of-trust together.

  "3 of your friends have said that they trust this
  certificate from Amazon.com. Do you want to accept it?"
Re:Tcpcrypt by daeken on Tuesday August 17, 2010 @03:39AM (#1610519)
If I had a dollar for every time a friend clicked a .exe email attachment, I'd be a very wealthy man. I damn sure don't trust my friends to verify the security of a cert.
Re:Tcpcrypt by drdaeman on Tuesday August 17, 2010 @04:45AM (#1610607)
I have some security-savvy friends (who I'd trust) and some not so smart friends (who I don't trust on this subject). So, the obvious idea is to put weight coefficients on WoT digraph edges. But I have a feeling that this would be too complicated to manage.
Re:Tcpcrypt by konad on Tuesday August 17, 2010 @06:15AM (#1610715)
Your mom would trust you and then her friends would trust her, then they'd all get burned because she meant to click No one time and it would all be your fault.
Re:Tcpcrypt by djcapelis on Tuesday August 17, 2010 @05:21AM (#1610657)
I don't care how you set up the PKI. You can use a carrier pigeon trust network if you want. If you can beat SSL's PKI then brilliant. The important part is to use PKI to auth first contact and verify no unseemly changes happen during subsequent contacts by bothering to remember the previous cert chains.