Thought it worth pointing out that Cheri are giving hardware capabilities another go.
yes, I was talking about hardware tagging, else you can’t protect capabilities solely in user space. Intel had tagged memory in the 90’s era i960 as well and, as I edited my comment to mention (thanks to your comment!) several others including most recently RISC-V).
IMHO the 432 had other structural problems and it wasn’t the tagging that killed it but it had enough problems that this is definitely not worth disagreeing about — perhaps that was indeed the straw that broke that camel’s back.
In userspace, you can protect capabilities within a process by forcing people to use a capability-safe language, or you can let people use whatever and instead focus on protecting capabilities between processes (or between a process and the kernel, or between machines).
Modern capability systems don't rely on hardware support and performance issues aren't usually cited as a problem with capabilities. In fact, capabilities can often perform better than ACLs since ACLs tend to require performing an expensive access check on every operation.