How did it come to this? It seems like the web browser is doing the operating system's job. Were OS vendors just asleep at the wheel?
My pet theory is that OS vendors didn't really need a good sandbox. They could just tell you to be careful what applications you run. But, nobody would accept web browser developers telling you to avoid browsing unknown websites, so they were forced to build a good sandbox.
But, I don't really know. I'm just really disappointed by OS security.
Normal people don't worry about malware rooting their OS. Normal people worry about malware ruining their un-backuped photos and work docs, something that few operating systems dare protect users from.
(Which is why the iOS model of computer security is IMO a sleeper breakthrough, and why I always always recommend iPads/Chromebooks to people I wouldn't trust to not download Comet Cursor.)
1. Highly-interactive, programmatic, cross-connected documents were (security-wise) a Very Bad Thing.
2. Secure systems divorced viewing of documents from either editing them or running code. Mostly.
Windows didn't do this, and ended up with massive security issues, but the systems were largely not massively interconnected. Yes, they were on business LANs, and yes, there were connections to some other systems (largely through email), but not today's "everything is on the Web and you're connecting to 100s or 1,000s of remote sites daily".
Unix systems, generally, did enforce separation. They were also typically more interconnected (remote filesystems, ftp, telnet, early SSH, early Web), but there was some sanity in data/code separation.
Unix systems could produce and view Postscript and PDF documents. Windows systems ... mostly couldn't. If you wanted to view a Word document, you either printed it out, or you opened it in MS Word.
Microsoft did, yes, make a read-only viewer application. If you tried to, say, scroll through a document by hitting the spacebar, it would pop up a dialog telling you you couldn't edit the document. Every. Fucking. Time. You. Hit. Space.
I nuked that mofo so fast. "less" with catdoc or mswordview worked well enough for me.
I'm not claiming that 1990s Unix / Linux systems had sufficient process/data separation or sandboxing for today's network environments. They didn't (and we've got the scars to show for it). But they were following a more appropriate tack, and did in general foster environments where documents weren't openly dangerous.
(Again: mostly, there were exceptions, but they also pushed limits and took things in directions that weren't generally intended by the software designers, in sharp contrast to Windows.)
* Written in a language other than C
* Doesn't have any access to your local system by design, not as a consequence of sandbox rules
* Is maintained serverside, so everyone gets patched instantly
Agreed. But this is also where the problems of spam begin.
Perhaps if we chose to 'phase out' MX records in DNS for something new, say 'MSG'. A domain could then have an MX as well as a MSG server... A local MTA would route to the 'new shiny messaging system', so that clients could use the one system to read emails. Remote MTAs could also lookup and see if there's a 'MSG' on the receiving end and talk to it instead, rather than the designated MX, increasing the security. (In this case the sending user would still be sending via a normal email client)
Ideally, everyone will migrate over to MSG, upgrading the world smoothly.
(I figure something like this has already been tried tho...?)
2c.
My only email volume problem anymore is entirely opt-in / self inflicted. Some percentage of global bandwidth is still wasted on spam, but it is a vanishingly small proportion of traffic for that to matter anymore. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
We still haven't squared Zooko's Triangle. What is the practical way to get a function like "document was sent with best effort for some legal purpose to a known party"? Are we just stuck with "login to the secure messaging site" emails from our banks?