Looking back, I should have asked him how intel evaluates security risks considering how much of modern day computing uses it (which makes it an extremely valuable black hack exploit since it can work on practically every computer).
> It is not just buggy, but Intel has gone further and defined "new ways to handle page tables" (see page 58).
The MMU, page tables, and TLB are all directly related.
That wasn't my intent at all. de Raadt makes good, generally applicable points.
Really?
How do you explain the following:
> These processors are buggy as hell, and some of these bugs don't just cause development/debugging problems, but will ASSUREDLY be exploitable from userland code.
> Note that some errata like AI65, AI79, AI43, AI39, AI90, AI99 scare the hell out of us.
> AI90 is exploitable on some operating systems (but not OpenBSD running default binaries).
Plus huge development effort in stack/address randomization, W^X pages, dynamic kernel and c library relinking, etc as simply 'concern about intel in general' but not any details 'in particular'?
Even if the stated position is not true, it would be logically inconsistent to assume someone whose operating system project focuses on 'security and correctness' to simply be making general statements and not being concerned with actual low-level details..
What you said: > but not any details 'in particular'?
Looking at the list of items Theo gave, most of them were fixed previously, and the others, at least to my largely uneducated eye, do not appear to be related to this specific issue.
Unless I am mistaken (and that's certainly possible!) it was not at all related to Spectre/Meltdown
AFAICT, de Raadt was concerned about Intel in general, but not the recent exploits in particular. We can find endless criticisms of every major company from the last 10 years (including on HN!); picking this one mailing list posting is bit arbitrary in the context of these exploits, even if de Raadt makes some good general points.