Intel Responds to Security Research Findings

Re:Intel Responds to Security Research Findings by nebulous1 on Wednesday January 03, 2018 @06:15PM (#16066400)

So it's your contention that Intel never guaranteed that ring 0 protected memory couldn't be read by code running in ring 3, thereby rendering the concept of memory read protection useless by design?

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Re:Intel Responds to Security Research Findings by mehrdadn on Wednesday January 03, 2018 @06:24PM (#16066461)

> So it's your contention that Intel never guaranteed that ring 0 protected memory couldn't be read by code running in ring 3.

Assuming by "read" you mean "inferred", yes, I'm not aware of any such guarantee, but again, I of course have't read everything they have published, so by all means prove me wrong.

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Re:Intel Responds to Security Research Findings by nebulous1 on Wednesday January 03, 2018 @07:28PM (#16066862)

Intel® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer’s Manual, Volume 3A 4-30

  4.6.1 Determination of Access Rights

  For user-mode accesses:
  — Data reads.
  Access rights depend on the mode of the linear address:
    ...
    • Data may not be read from any supervisor-mode address.

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Re:Intel Responds to Security Research Findings by mehrdadn on Wednesday January 03, 2018 @07:41PM (#16066935)

And this contradicts the above how, exactly?

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Re:Intel Responds to Security Research Findings by nebulous1 on Wednesday January 03, 2018 @07:45PM (#16066954)

> And this contradicts the above how, exactly?

Documentation: Data may not be read from any supervisor-mode address.

Published vulnerability: Data may be read from any supervisor-mode address.

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