Note that under Linux x64 IIRC the whole physical memory is mapped in kernel pages... playing with some adjusting variables, if this theory is correct, I don't see why we could not read all of it. Might be the same under Windows.
I've not checked in depth yet but it could match with all the technical facts we have: very important bug for which the semi-rushed workaround with high perf impact will be backported; affect general purpose OSes but IIRC does not affect some hypervisors (I guess they already do not map at all the pages of other systems while one is running), does not affect AMD (or maybe at least not this way and KPTI can not fix it for them) because of their microarch, involves data leak.
That was known since pentium 3 times, I wonder why nobody thought of this as a wonderful exploit target before
>I'm 90% convinced there is no way Intel managed to close all the side-channels on such a complex architecture
This is why one should not use verilog and run formal validation of all and everything related to hdl code
Tooling support for VHDL is lacking thought, any big company with in house formal verification must have their own tooling...
Ideally, a much closer to complete verification should be done in addition to simulation, like a mathematical proof that register content will never be like set A if inputs are set B
The top comment said:
> This basically adds another set of tools to the architectural-level attack toolbox. From reading this I expect we'll see some interesting developments in the future.
And of course there's an obligatory comment beginning with "this cannot possibly work... "
its a good point about TLB and VIPT but I don't think this closes the whole class of potential issue; if too-much speculative execution is performed (even just a little bit, even just when you use some obscure instructions) on anything data depend that has been speculatively loaded before privilege checking, I guess its possible to recover the data.