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Re:The mysterious case of the Linux Page Table Isolation pat... by jedisct1 on Monday January 01, 2018 @07:11PM (#16048843)
They might have succeeded to make it work: https://cyber.wtf/2017/07/28/negative-result-reading-kernel-...
Re:The mysterious case of the Linux Page Table Isolation pat... by wilun on Monday January 01, 2018 @08:13PM (#16049083)
Ok so it seems that Intel CPU do some speculative execution on priviledged data from unpriviledged code, including from (at least some and at least part of) separate following instructions. Given the microarchitectural complexity and the already well-known side channel attacks, I would not be surprised at all if someone just finished the work and demonstrated that you can actually read priviledged data with a correct reliability. This might even not be very hard. You can think of prefetching, TLB, cache, hyperthreading, and any combination of those and other features. I'm 90% convinced there is no way Intel managed to close all the side-channels on such a complex architecture, so if they really do continue too much speculative execution I think they (well, actually we :p ) are owned.

Note that under Linux x64 IIRC the whole physical memory is mapped in kernel pages... playing with some adjusting variables, if this theory is correct, I don't see why we could not read all of it. Might be the same under Windows.

I've not checked in depth yet but it could match with all the technical facts we have: very important bug for which the semi-rushed workaround with high perf impact will be backported; affect general purpose OSes but IIRC does not affect some hypervisors (I guess they already do not map at all the pages of other systems while one is running), does not affect AMD (or maybe at least not this way and KPTI can not fix it for them) because of their microarch, involves data leak.

Re:The mysterious case of the Linux Page Table Isolation pat... by baybal2 on Tuesday January 02, 2018 @07:12AM (#16051424)
>Intel CPU do some speculative execution on priviledged data from unpriviledged code, including from (at least some and at least part of) separate following instructions.

That was known since pentium 3 times, I wonder why nobody thought of this as a wonderful exploit target before

>I'm 90% convinced there is no way Intel managed to close all the side-channels on such a complex architecture

This is why one should not use verilog and run formal validation of all and everything related to hdl code

Re:The mysterious case of the Linux Page Table Isolation pat... by orbifold on Tuesday January 02, 2018 @07:58AM (#16051585)
What should one use instead? VHDL, Bluespec, Chisel? I don‘t know of any solution that makes verification significantly easier compared to SystemVerilog.
Re:The mysterious case of the Linux Page Table Isolation pat... by baybal2 on Tuesday January 02, 2018 @08:25AM (#16051691)
It will be VHDL for the reason it removes a lot undefined behaviours by design.

Tooling support for VHDL is lacking thought, any big company with in house formal verification must have their own tooling...

Re:The mysterious case of the Linux Page Table Isolation pat... by JdeBP on Tuesday January 02, 2018 @09:53AM (#16052118)
What undefined behaviours are those?
Re:The mysterious case of the Linux Page Table Isolation pat... by wastewaste on Tuesday January 02, 2018 @10:02AM (#16052175)
tricky grammar. You mean formal, mathematical verification instead of simulation, I suppose, but I am not aware of any different method.
Re:The mysterious case of the Linux Page Table Isolation pat... by baybal2 on Tuesday January 02, 2018 @11:42AM (#16053021)
Yes, mathematical verification. Normally, for an any much expensive tape out a partial mathematical verification is done with tooling on hand in addition to brute force simulation.

Ideally, a much closer to complete verification should be done in addition to simulation, like a mathematical proof that register content will never be like set A if inputs are set B

Re:The mysterious case of the Linux Page Table Isolation pat... by Pyxl101 on Monday January 01, 2018 @07:23PM (#16048901)
Previously posted on HN as well: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14988157

The top comment said:

> This basically adds another set of tools to the architectural-level attack toolbox. From reading this I expect we'll see some interesting developments in the future.

And of course there's an obligatory comment beginning with "this cannot possibly work... "

Re:The mysterious case of the Linux Page Table Isolation pat... by wilun on Monday January 01, 2018 @08:26PM (#16049143)
> And of course there's an obligatory comment beginning with "this cannot possibly work... "

its a good point about TLB and VIPT but I don't think this closes the whole class of potential issue; if too-much speculative execution is performed (even just a little bit, even just when you use some obscure instructions) on anything data depend that has been speculatively loaded before privilege checking, I guess its possible to recover the data.