Re:Why TLS 1.3 isn't in browsers yet
by mkonecny on Thursday December 28, 2017 @11:05AM
(#16022785)
This is exactly what they are trying to avoid. Read the article and you will see this thinking is how the POODLE attack happened.
[ Parent
| on HN ]
Yes, I read it, but I think a clean new TLS 1.3 with that old retry fallback system like before would still have been the best solution to establish TLS 1.3 without breakage. Poddle was solved by SCSV and this could be part of TLS 1.3 again, but even a desaster that makes us turn off TLS 1.2 5 years from now is a "good" solution because then the middleboxes have been upgraded.
Why do you assume that the middleshits would get upgraded?
If fallback works, fallback works. End of story. 80% of operators (governments, corporations, soho setups) will explicitly prefer not touching things if at all possible. They won't fix their "not broken" network.