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Re:Why TLS 1.3 isn't in browsers yet by cesarb on Wednesday December 27, 2017 @05:51PM (#16018772)
It's the "fail closed" principle in action: if I don't understand it, it must be malicious, so the connection should be rejected as swiftly as possible.

Also seen in firewalls which drop all ICMP packets ("the only real-world use of ICMP is ping floods, right?"), breaking PMTUD.

Re:Why TLS 1.3 isn't in browsers yet by jchw on Wednesday December 27, 2017 @07:43PM (#16019394)
But this isn't fail-closed. The specification allows for newer versions. The problem is, you are supposed to spit back the version you actually support instead of disconnecting. I don't understand how this can be interpreted as anything but non-compliance of the standard.
Re:Why TLS 1.3 isn't in browsers yet by Spivak on Thursday December 28, 2017 @12:45AM (#16020558)
I would say that technically it's complaint because there's nothing saying a server can't tear down a connection whenever it wants.

Our InfoSec friends are rightfully suspicious of 'weird' looking packets and data from clients. It's one of the few ways to catch/stop zero day vulns. It does make things difficult when legitimate traffic is caught in the crossfire but such is the nature of most security practices.

Re:Why TLS 1.3 isn't in browsers yet by DiabloD3 on Wednesday December 27, 2017 @06:20PM (#16018971)
Fun fact: Trying to apply that to IPv6 ends up without a working network connection.
Re:Why TLS 1.3 isn't in browsers yet by r1ch on Wednesday December 27, 2017 @06:27PM (#16019012)
Microsoft's Skype for business servers block(ed?) ICMPv6. That was a fun one to track down when there was an MTU issue on our network, especially when their diagnostic tool claimed there was a 403 error from the SIP endpoint!