They hold up pretty well during large price crashes.
In a crisis, prices move discontinuously. On one side of the discontinuity, you have adequate reserves. On the other side, you're broke. There is no moment in between when one gets to gently liquidate collateral.
> They hold up pretty well during large price crashes
Usually I'd say past performance does not guarantee future results, but in this case, we haven't had the past performance. Every Bitcoin has responded to even intraday crashes by pulling the plug [1].
[1] https://news.bitcoin.com/coinbase-customers-suffer-from-dela...
Coinbase/gdax is a joke of an exchange and handles nowhere near the volume of bitmex or bitfinex.
It still happens quite often. In practice, the buy-side order book doesn't vanish. It just goes from $19k, $19k, $19k to $17k, $9k, $2k. The liquidating exchange hits the $17k, and then the $9k. Now you have a trade at $9k which (a) prompts further forced liquidations and (b) causes everyone to panic.
> loss is either socialised or paid thru the insurance fund
Insurance fund? Who is insuring Bitmex?
[1] https://support.bitfinex.com/hc/en-us/articles/115004555165-...
And cascading margin calls are possible, but it seems like all exchanges except for gdax/coinbase have a strategy to handle it.
That isn't an insurance fund. It's BitMEX's reserves, re-branded. In the event of a crash the value of these assets would fall. If the price drop is large enough, it could burn through these reserves.
It is prudent that BitMEX seems to be holding reserves. This is what good exchanges do! But consider why Goldman Sachs is requiring 100% margin while Bitfinex is doing the same at 30% [1]. The additional risk is borne by the exchange's (or in GS's case, broker's) equity. When that runs out, the exchange (or broker, as applicable) busts. We separated broker-dealers, who can lend on margin, from the exchanges in the equity markets for a reason.
> it seems like all exchanges except for gdax/coinbase have a strategy to handle it
Based on what?
[1] https://support.bitfinex.com/hc/en-us/articles/115004555165-...
Look at the GDAX ethereum crash for a recent real-live crypto example.
The same way every market before central counterparties (CCPs) failed: exchange participants default and leave the exchange holding the bag [1]. If an exchange permits shorting, then it permits margin accounts. When prices drop, margin borrowers have a habit of defaulting.
This is in addition to the risk of lightly-regulated exchanges having fewer Bitcoins than they claim to have [2][3].
> Counterparty risk also exists for established exchanges
It's better managed. Goldman Sachs requires 100% margin on its Bitcoin trades [4]. This is only the first layer of protection. If you bust on a CME trade, your broker makes up the difference; if they bust, other CME members make up the difference; et cetera [5]. Central counterparties were created to solve this problem.
[1] https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2...
[2] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-05/mystery-s...
[3] https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/11/gox-bitco...
[4] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-14/goldman-s...
[5] https://www.cmegroup.com/education/files/balancing-ccp-and-m...