Rust absolutely works on 32-bit platforms, though we often use the i686 target rather than an i386 one. Platform support list is here: https://forge.rust-lang.org/platform-support.html
Theo is talking about building rustc, not compiling most Rust programs. That's the first distinction that it seems like many people are missing.
However, apparently the compilation process OOMs when building on a i386 box. I don't use those platforms, but I'd believe it. The Rust compiler is large. However, I thought (and looking at our CI, this seems to be true https://travis-ci.org/rust-lang/rust/jobs/311223817) we do compile with an i686-unknown-linux-gnu host (for this build), so I dunno. Maybe it was a fluke, maybe I'm misunderstanding, I'm not sure.
We often provide artifacts via cross-compiling, but this is unacceptable to OpenBSD. That's totally okay. They have good reasons for doing this.
The compiler is one of the largest Rust programs that exist. Last I checked, it was three quarters of a million lines of Rust, but a quick loc shows 1.5 million lines of Rust, 2.3 million lines of C++, and 900,000 lines of C (again, mostly LLVM and jemalloc).
Servo is also very large, and they don't report having OOMs, though I'm not sure if they build on 32-bit or just cross-compile.
That bug really bites hard any code heavy on iterators (Rust often praised feature!). It has reliable reproduce test-case, but still it's already year old and was down-prioritized!
Hard to believe anybody uses Rust for real large project given so little attention to crucial details.
> I'm going to lower this from P-high to reflect reality. I'm still eager to investigate but haven't had time, and making it P-high is not helping =)
P-high means someone is actively assigned and working on it, so yeah in some sense this is a down-prioritization, but only from "Someone is working on this, so put your work somewhere else" to "this is open to work on"; the de-prioritization may lead to it getting fixed sooner, as Niko is a busy guy.
So, "nobody wants to deal with" feels like a mischaracterization to me here.
> The de-prioritization may lead to it getting fixed sooner, as Niko is a busy guy
And Niko put "medium" priority month ago :)
It does sound kind of bad for Rust, but the competition isn't doing much better :p (weak excuse, I know)
That's not to say either one is "worse" or "better", but comparing the two on an axis like platform support is like comparing tomahawk missiles and tall ships. Totally different requirements and use cases.
I still thought that we generally kept it down to around 2GB of space, but maybe that's wrong.
I may be remembering the details a bit wrong, but it was a good read.
https://www.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thomp...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Computer_System_Evalua...
One compiler made to the highest standard in development assurance is CompCert.
It has specs of everything it does, proofs it does it in tool with minimalist checker, extracts to ML that can be compared against those specs in various ways (eg visually), can optionally be compiled with a mini-ML compiler or Scheme you homebrew yourself, and passed exhaustive testing by third party with only a few bugs in specs (not code). There's another using formal specs called KCC which could be ported to something bootstrappable like META II or Scheme.
The other requirement from TCSEC was that source be supplied to customer to build with their onsite, trusted tools. I looked into even having compilers done in Perl since it's already widely deployed. David A. Wheeler made brilliant suggestion of either bash or awk. I have put tools for those and more on rain1's bootstrapping page. rain1 or someone there called the concept "Ubiquitous Implementations." Note we've focused on technical content, not presentation, on that one being busy folks. Looks rough. :)
http://bootstrapping.miraheze.org/
You also need repo security to protect that source with it either cryptographically sealed and/or sent over secure transport. Link below on repo security from David A. Wheeler. Quite a few forms of transport security now.
https://www.dwheeler.com/essays/scm-security.html
After Thompson wrote on Karger's attack in 1980's, it took a life of its own among people that continue to mostly ignore the prior solutions. It's a problem absolutely solved to death starting with the person who discovered it in MULTICS Security Evaluation. Far as state-of-the-art, the current path of research is exploring how to integrate solutions for many languages, models, or levels of detail in one picture of a system with no abstraction gap attacks with proof of that for all inputs. That's a bit more complex but just an imperative language to assembly delivered and bootstrapped? Straight-forward but tedious, time-consuming work the first time it's done. :) Also, expensive if you buy CompCert which is only free for GPL stuff. Two of us are eyeballed CakeML's lowest-level languages as a cheat around that for verified bootstrapping.
EDIT: Btw, all that is technical discussion and argument. For fun, you might enjoy the story "Coding Machines" which is about only coding-related story I started reading and couldn't put down. Probably took an hour to read. It covers discovery of a Karger-Thompson-style attack along with how people might respond mentally and in terms of solutions. Some other stuff in that one.
Is cargo supported on i386 platforms? Also Rust complies itself, afaik there is no way to compile Rust/Cargo but to use previous version of it. If one of the past builds of Rust is backdoored, any version between then and now is backdoored, language is safe, environment... as safe as it was never compromised. OpenBSD compiles everywhere where C code works, Rust/Cargo works where it's supported and it will takes decades to catch-up on some architectures.