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Re:How Cybercriminals Can Abuse Chat Platform APIs as C&C In... by Klathmon on Tuesday November 28, 2017 @10:47AM (#15798242)
I have to admit, I've had a lot of fun in the past thinking of creative ways to control botnets. It's a fun thought exercise in developing in an area where everything is adversarial to your goal. And the fact that the amount of information you really need to transfer is so trivially small that you can get some really creative "solutions".

My favorite idea so far is to look for the existence of a specific username across several services for commands. Only the usernames are (in part) generated via a TOTP style rolling code. So to see if something should activate, it will look for the existence of a username of "imnotabot349556" on reddit, HN, and twitter. if it sees any of them, it can read a small command from any number of places on those sites that the user can post some kind of comment/profile/text.

This is super easy to control securely (could be done from anywhere, using any machine, over TOR or other networks), is hard to shut down (the rolling codes mean they would need to either have access to the "secret" and ban all future codes, or just ban "imnotabot*" which wouldn't be sustainable if multiple botnets started using this method, not to mention you could just switch to a hash of everything as the username), and is fairly fullproof (no reliance on any one network or channel). And with some forethought, an update mechanism can be built into it as well, so when someone gets close to your scheme, you could have all your bots update at a moment's notice to a new one.

At the end of the day, trying to stop a C&C server of a botnet is a futile exercise. Once the botnet is out there, there's no stopping it by shutting down a C&C server. There are just SO many ways to pass information, and when the information is on the size of hundreds of bytes in some cases, there's just no hope.

Re:How Cybercriminals Can Abuse Chat Platform APIs as C&C In... by samwillis on Tuesday November 28, 2017 @11:56AM (#15798947)
Using a popular Blockchain seems to me to be the best C&C system. It's distributed and authenticated. The botnet could either talk directly to the network or fallback to http and look at the hundreds of websites that allow you to read the blockchain. It would be "impossible" for the C&C to be taken over without the collaboration of the Blockchain developers and miners...

It means "spending" to send a command, but you only lose the fee.

Re:How Cybercriminals Can Abuse Chat Platform APIs as C&C In... by 3pt14159 on Tuesday November 28, 2017 @02:49PM (#15800747)
Eh, I dunno. Easy to corporate firewall off. Easy to detect once it starts. I'd rather just communicate through a google API of some kind. Or maybe a clever series of dropbox accounts.
Re:How Cybercriminals Can Abuse Chat Platform APIs as C&C In... by munin on Tuesday November 28, 2017 @10:53AM (#15798312)
> the rolling codes mean they would need to either have access to the "secret" and ban all future codes, or just ban "imnotabot*" which wouldn't be sustainable if multiple botnets started using this method

They will have access to the secret, because they have access to the programs that run the TOTP algorithm.

Re:How Cybercriminals Can Abuse Chat Platform APIs as C&C In... by Klathmon on Tuesday November 28, 2017 @10:57AM (#15798352)
But it relies on all services I would use to add custom code to block all future rolling codes. For a problem that they don't really have any financial reason to write that custom code to stop it.

And any fix that they introduce, can be trivially updated to change around by any of the other services. They'd have to coordinate across all services that are used to update at the same time in order to stop it.

Re:How Cybercriminals Can Abuse Chat Platform APIs as C&C In... by munin on Tuesday November 28, 2017 @11:01AM (#15798387)
No, you reverse engineer the "domain generation algorithm" and figure out what the secret seeds are as input, then every time you need to know the name of the rendezvous point you figure out what the current seed is (easy if it's static, a little harder if it's dynamic) and run the algorithm.

Anyone that does this can register the reddit/twitter handles or domain names as soon as they figure this out, if they aren't pre-registered. And if you're the provider, you are then given a list of accounts to kill. Now you're in a game of cat and mouse with the botnet operator, and each move you take kills off some of the operators bots, perhaps all of them if you get ahead of them by enough.

Re:How Cybercriminals Can Abuse Chat Platform APIs as C&C In... by jstanley on Tuesday November 28, 2017 @01:00PM (#15799663)
The commands could be cryptographically signed to prevent "malicious" control of the botnet.
Re:How Cybercriminals Can Abuse Chat Platform APIs as C&C In... by munin on Tuesday November 28, 2017 @01:17PM (#15799841)
True, but you can prevent the introduction of new commands.

In this setting, if there's a central point, it can be cut. It's different if there is no central point (i.e. conficker P2P).

Re:How Cybercriminals Can Abuse Chat Platform APIs as C&C In... by fragmede on Tuesday November 28, 2017 @11:22AM (#15798590)
> trying to stop a C&C server of a botnet is a futile exercise.

Laptop users who want broad Internet access (and will complain loudly if reddit/HN/Twitter is "down") aren't the same thing as the app server that only talks to a short whitelisted set of RFC1918 IPs, on specific ports only, and doesn't have Internet access - not even DNS. (WannaCry demonstrated why not.)

Reddit and the like needs to accept they are hosting botnet C&C servers due to hosting loads of user-generated content (I'd do an invite-only subreddit with a tracking pixel in the CSS), but that doesn't make it pointless for the rest of us to do something where possible.

Re:How Cybercriminals Can Abuse Chat Platform APIs as C&C In... by __sha3d2 on Tuesday November 28, 2017 @05:29PM (#15802489)
> (I'd do an invite-only subreddit with a tracking pixel in the CSS)

So that you could nuke it if a not-you IP accessed the subreddit? That's nice and could be very easily automated.

Re:How Cybercriminals Can Abuse Chat Platform APIs as C&C In... by lawl on Wednesday November 29, 2017 @09:32AM (#15807014)
Except it doesn't work because reddit sanitizes their CSS and doesn't allow url() to external hosts. You need to upload the images you want to reference in the CSS to reddit.
Re:How Cybercriminals Can Abuse Chat Platform APIs as C&C In... by mschuster91 on Tuesday November 28, 2017 @02:40PM (#15800666)
> The app server that only talks to a short whitelisted set of RFC1918 IPs, on specific ports only, and doesn't have Internet access - not even DNS.

Problem is that this stops application level automated updating. Firewalls are all fine but unfortunately they operate at IP level, not DNS - which means good luck if the vendor's auto-update server uses stuff like Cloudflare, ELB or anything other that (more or less rapidly) changes IP addresses.