In 2010, MITM attackers are the default. It takes only marginal additional effort to intercept SSL traffic. Attackers don't sniff anymore. The disconnect between people implementing SSL --- who appear to be permanently stuck in 1997 --- and the people dealing with actual attacks is... frustrating.
Do you think it is possible for a third party completely unrelated to you to correctly decide who you do and do not trust? Do you think it is possible for a couple hundred such third parties?
Your question is nearly equivalent to mine.
Security just can't be made zero-effort, in my opinion. You can only get psuedosecurity for zero effort, which is what we have now. Might even be better than nothing; at least SSL constrains the number of entities that can trivially sniff your traffic to the two endpoints and any MitM that manages to wedge itself in (which isn't impossible but takes effort), which is at least a bona fide reduction in attack surface.