Specifically:
* Nobody has come up with a user-comprehensible abstraction to represent the machinery needed to represent the chain of actors needed to assert that "this is really Bank of America". Instead, we wound up with a buried configuration box that says "Verisign is God."
* An obvious corrollary: there shouldn't be a single global set of browser-accepted root certificates. End-users should subscribe to CA's as needed (again: the UI abstractions aren't there yet to make this doable). The IETF should come up with a process to run a CA to certify and name other CA's.
* It shouldn't be possible to easily click through warnings about invalid certificates, since that warning amounts to "there is no security provided by SSL on this connection." Implementing this would require service operators to have better ways of making sure their certs were valid.
All this stuff sounds highly dramatic, but I want to remind you that none of these changes would alter the SSL protocol or any of its implementations (OpenSSL, NSS, SCHANNEL, etc).
I don't want to have to pay or verify my identity to run my own SSL-secured mail server, IRC bouncer, or similar service. Why should I need to? But if I don't, then just about every SSL client in the world falls down and sucks its thumbs or screams bloody murder at me because my certificate isn't signed by the holy gatekeepers...
People on HN can and do argue about this until they are blue in the face, but the fact of the matter is that authenticated connections aren't just a special "bonus" that SSL provides beyond encryption. Every secure encrypted protocol makes arrangements to authenticate keys; this is the same thing that makes your first SSH connection to a new server insecure (demonstrating that problem used to be a sport at security conventions).
Isn't this a good thing? I'm not sure its possible to represent the mechanism in any other way that doesn't involve actually having to teach users about how SSL works.
My guess is that the answer will involve having something more meaningful than the name "Verisign" at the root of the certificate change. "Secure Banking Sites", which ideally would be managed by (wait for it) secure banking sites, sounds better.
We can get to that world without forklifting out OpenSSL.
Do you think it is possible for a third party completely unrelated to you to correctly decide who you do and do not trust? Do you think it is possible for a couple hundred such third parties?
Your question is nearly equivalent to mine.
Security just can't be made zero-effort, in my opinion. You can only get psuedosecurity for zero effort, which is what we have now. Might even be better than nothing; at least SSL constrains the number of entities that can trivially sniff your traffic to the two endpoints and any MitM that manages to wedge itself in (which isn't impossible but takes effort), which is at least a bona fide reduction in attack surface.
Do you think a global, managed and secure PKI is feasible?