Safety vs. authorization are completely orthogonal. The former is an objective property of a program, to be established or refuted with formal proof. The latter depends on the subjective whims of one specific human being, in this case, the sysadmin. And, in my experience, the typical sysadmin is not a good enough semanticist to determine whether a program is safe or not.
Formal proofs can also contain logic errors.
Any kind of safety improvement is better than what C offers.
And my point is that this is useless in the absence of someone or something capable of reliably determining whether the code is safe to run.
> Formal proofs can also contain logic errors.
So you have competent people write them.
As for competent programmer, we all know how many corporations search who they hire.
It was a systems programming language based on Algol and already had the notion of unsafe code for low level code.
Those modules had to be marked as UNSAFE and could only be executed if allowed to do so by the sysadmin.
Similar exemples could be provided about PL/S, PL/8, Mesa, Modula-2, Modula-3 and many others.
One big contribution that Rust brings into the table is to educate a whole generation that belives the myth that C was the very first systems programming language, that there are actually safer alternatives.