Might take years but atleast the airplanes keep flying instead of crashing their computers and consequently themselves.
Indeed you're probably right there. Fortunately security-focused distributions and individuals would be able to change the defaults in the interim.
Granted, I'm looking at this from a perspective where our company compiles our own kernel for use in embedded devices, so we can have whatever patch sets supported we want. But I think that's much better than everyone having to use the "report only" patches for years, or even worse, the features never getting into the kernel in the first place.
Counterpoint: most developers and users are not actively following their logs at any level, and maybe something should be done to make it more common. Possibly stderr logging of such errors in libc (or some other commonly used library which already sometimes logs errors on its own, like glib). 3:- )
It's only in more recent years when the automotive and IoT industries have started to get involved in the Linux Foundation and them asking for more security features that he seems to have tried to find ways to "compromise" with security people.
For those who want it, here's his first email in the thread, profanity and all: https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/17/767
https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/17/423
Where he's quite civil and explains quite clearly why he won't accept the patch, and what should happen for the patch to be accepted. The Kees's reply insisting on the merge is what led to the profanity-laden email, and frankly I understand that (not condone, but understand from a human-reaction point of view) - how many times does one have to iterate his viewpoint to others to make himself heard?
Entire thread links from start:
1 - http://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1711.2/01325.html
2 - http://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1711.2/01357.html
3 - http://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1711.2/01368.html
4 - http://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1711.2/01636.html
5 - http://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1711.2/01701.html
> IT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE when security people set magical new rules, and then make the kernel panic when those new rules are violated.
> That is pure and utter bullshit. We've had more than a quarter century _without_ those rules, you don't then suddenly walz in and say "oh, everbody must do this, and if you haven't, we will kill the kernel".
> The fact that you "introduced the fallback mode" late in that series just shows HOW INCREDIBLY BROKEN the series started out.
This makes perfect sense and outlines a real problem with security patching in general.
I interpreted his response in practical terms as essentially being the following. Patch set merge 1 has "report" as default and "kill" as a non-default option. Patch set merge 2 has "kill" as default and "report" as a non-default option. Patch set merge 3 removes support for "report". This way we have the best of both worlds: we eventually reach the thing that actually adds real security benefit, which makes security folks happy. And we don't break everybody's computers immediately, allowing time for the more obvious bugs to surface via "report", which makes users and developers happy. Seems like a reasonable process to me.