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Re:Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness by dvt on Friday November 17, 2017 @11:42PM (#15727791)
Dennet is a reductive materialist. He'd probably disagree with my hardline depiction of him, but, in my opinion, if it quacks like a duck and swims like a duck, it's probably a duck. For what it's worth, he identifies as a 'teleofunctionalist' (???).

The author of the piece doesn't seem to be a reductive materialist, so obviously Dennet won't jive with him. I'm also not a materialist, so I don't really find Dennet very insightful. For example, he denies the existence of qualia (and rejects everything that comes with that experience; see Nagel's famous What is it like to be a bat?).

With that said, I think he's made some pretty big contributions to materialism, in particular with regards to evolutionary theory and by providing some pretty solid theories of an 'emergent' non-hand-wavy consciousness. I don't really agree with his points and I think he's being crudely reductive, but dismissing the man's life work is kind of unfair.

Re:Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness by pdonis on Saturday November 18, 2017 @12:49AM (#15727920)
> he denies the existence of qualia

No, he doesn't. He just says that qualia aren't what we intuitively think they are.

Denying the existence of qualia would mean denying that we have subjective experiences. Dennett doesn't deny that. But he does deny that many of our usual intuitions about qualia are correct, by showing how they lead to inconsistent and incoherent thinking about our experiences.

It's quite true that Dennett's view of qualia is very different from that of many other philosophers. But to say he denies the existence of qualia does not come close to doing justice to his actual views.

Re:Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness by dvt on Saturday November 18, 2017 @02:17AM (#15728123)
> Denying the existence of qualia would mean denying that we have subjective experiences. Dennett doesn't deny that. But he does deny that many of our usual intuitions about qualia are correct, by showing how they lead to inconsistent and incoherent thinking about our experiences.

I don't think you're right. See here[1]:

> There is a limited use for such interpretations of subjects' protocols, I have argued (Dennett 1978a; 1979, esp., pp.109-110; 1982), but they will not help the defenders of qualia here. Logical constructs out of judgments must be viewed as akin to theorists' fictions, and the friends of qualia want the existence of a particular quale in any particular case to be an empirical fact in good standing, not a theorist's useful interpretive fiction, else it will not loom as a challenge to functionalism or materialism or third-person, objective science.

According to the man himself, he thinks that they are "theorists' fictions" and "not empirical facts" -- that's about as "they aren't a thing" as you can possibly get.

[1] http://cogprints.org/254/1/quinqual.htm

Re:Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness by pdonis on Saturday November 18, 2017 @03:36AM (#15728268)
If you're willing to draw a distinction between "denying the existence of qualia" and "denying the existence of subjective experience", then yes, I agree that "denying the existence of qualia" can be taken in its usual sense--"they aren't a thing", as you say. Everything Dennett says about qualia has to be interpreted with this distinction in mind.

However, I'm not sure the poster I was responding to would agree with allowing that distinction. Certainly many commentators on Dennett have interpreted "denying the existence of qualia" as "denying the existence of subjective experience", which Dennett does not do. For a person who refuses to allow the distinction, I think one has to simply disagree that Dennett denies the existence of qualia; he just says they aren't what most people think they are.

Another way of looking at this is to ask what, exactly, the word "qualia" refers to. If it refers to subjective experiences themselves, then of course they exist; but, as Dennett says, they might not be what most people think they are. But if the word "qualia" refers to something else, then what it refers to might indeed not even exist. Many philosophical arguments come down to people using words to mean different things and talking past each other.

Re:Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness by dvt on Saturday November 18, 2017 @04:31AM (#15728389)
> However, I'm not sure the poster I was responding to would agree with allowing that distinction. Certainly many commentators on Dennett have interpreted "denying the existence of qualia" as "denying the existence of subjective experience", which Dennett does not do. For a person who refuses to allow the distinction, I think one has to simply disagree that Dennett denies the existence of qualia; he just says they aren't what most people think they are.

I read a lot of his back and forth with Chalmers & co. (and philosophy of mind in general), and no one argues that Dennett doesn't think subjective experiences exist. But subjective experiences are not qualia. Qualia are phenomenal properties of experience. Presumably, one could have subjective experiences without these phenomenal properties. Indeed, that is what Dennett argues, see the IEP[1]

PS: Not sure why I'm getting downvoted -- guess the materialists have a bone to pick ;)

[1] http://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/#H5

Re:Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness by pdonis on Sunday November 19, 2017 @01:55AM (#15732649)
> no one argues that Dennett doesn't think subjective experiences exist

I don't know if anyone has stated that directly. But I've seen plenty of responses to Dennett that basically amount to saying that the only way they can make sense of his statement that qualia don't exist is that he means subjective experiences don't exist. So even if they don't think he actually believes that, they certainly seem to be unable to interpret his philosophical claims any other way.

Re:Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness by dvt on Monday November 20, 2017 @12:03AM (#15737914)
They are attacking a weak interpretation of his argument. It's a pretty good tactic (that might have some merit), but it's pretty uncharitable.
Re:Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness by dwaltrip on Saturday November 18, 2017 @04:35PM (#15730838)
> Qualia are phenomenal properties of experience. Presumably, one could have subjective experiences without these phenomenal properties.

Care to elaborate on this? From my angle, arguments if this sort tend to veer towards wild speculation. I understand others feel differently.

I usually can't help but read it as unnecessary leaps of logic spurred by some presupposed metaphysics. I hope I'm not projecting too much here -- you may have a more considerate take on things.

Re:Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness by dvt on Monday November 20, 2017 @12:11AM (#15737958)
> Care to elaborate on this?

Elaborate on what, exactly? Qualia being phenomenal properties of experience? I think that's a pretty atomic claim.

Basically, your experience E (a headache, for example) has some physical properties attached to it (maybe being caused by blood vessels expanding and putting pressure on certain nerves), but also some phenomenal properties (the feeling of getting a headache). The instance of this feeling is a quale. It's debated whether or not qualia are the same across people[1] (but my intuition is yes). Empiricists like Dennett argue that you don't need qualia and that they are a sort of unnecessary hand-wavy magic.

[1] http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/gradmind01/newpap...

Re:Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness by dwaltrip on Wednesday November 22, 2017 @05:03PM (#15761095)
> Basically, your experience E (a headache, for example) has some physical properties attached to it (maybe being caused by blood vessels expanding and putting pressure on certain nerves), but also some phenomenal properties (the feeling of getting a headache). The instance of this feeling is a quale.

Hmm. Does the nature of this particular "headache quale" depend in any way on the totality of current conceptions the subject has built up over the years their life?

My understanding and intuition tells me such "quale" are nothing more than the current instantaneous sensations being filtered through the accumulated mental conceptions, associations, and patterns that the entity has acquired over time (caveat: there are likely some very basic "pre-installed" conceptions that new-borns have from their genetics).

What is the argument to differentiate "quale" from mere momentary, initial perceptions, the raw sensation + initial neural processing? E.g. the first actual conscious awareness of some stimuli, framed and grounded by some initial mental conception of the sensation?

At the risk of being redundant: I have trouble imagining what it would mean, or that it is possible, or makes any sense at all, for a sentient being to be aware of some raw stimuli without it being grounded in some pre-existing conceptual framework. To me, that sounds like trying to play a video game by looking at the raw bits, the 1s and 0s, of the game data.

I realize that my interpretation of qualia doesn't provide a way to distinguish between the initial perception and any immediately subsequent integration/contemplation/reflection that may happen in the first second or two after the perception. I would argue that it may never be possible to draw a clear line, at least when talking about anything that has reached the level of conscious awareness. My view of the fundamental nature of conscious awareness does not seem compatible with any clear line between conscious sensation and conscious perception. I haven't read Dennett, but maybe this is similar to what he is getting at.

Edit: Almost forgot. Memory, especially short-term, plays a critical role here. My most immediate perception should "fit" with all of the perceptions that occurred over the past few seconds. I imagine that the initial neural processing which attempts to ground the stimuli and integrate it with the brain's acquired conceptual framework is also seeking to preserve "continuity". I think we all have experienced the jarring and sometimes unpleasant effect of when that process goes astray.

Re:Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness by escherplex on Saturday November 18, 2017 @01:16AM (#15727980)
How are you going to formulate an objective phenomenological description of a subjective space which serves as a personal reification substrate for broadcast of 'qualia' models formulated from percepts and concepts by a received personal cognitive operating system? As you know, one school locks on to a 'bubbling-up' dy/dx = -yx and survival utility as overlords with 'consciousness' (whatever that is) as an emergent property supervening on a material substrate. Resonates OK if one's received nature/nurture is conformal to that description but how was/is what is experienced as 'order' possible? Ultimately it has to be postulated as a-priori predilections since order and chaos are strange bedfellows. Another school postulates 'consciousness is the only reality' a-priori with all as projections of some intentionality field. David Bohme seemed to subscribe to that principle since in 'The Undivided Universe - An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory' he postulates three spaces: 1) intentionality, 2) stochastic (only virtual Schrodinger's cats there) and 3) an objective or reified space (here). But as the original article concludes 'qui sait?'. Maybe epoché is more appropriate.
Re:Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness by sgt101 on Saturday November 18, 2017 @03:41AM (#15728282)
I think "bubblers up" would say that order arises from utility in the sense that initial "bubbles" happen in simple organisms and enable them to become more complex and successful. They would argue that those that did not acquire ordering and editing would be unable to step further along the path because the utility of the created mechanism for survival and reproduction is low.

The broadcast of qualia models element that you include feels debatable to me; the transmission of concepts and ideas is surely very new and anomalous in the history of the development of aware and experiencing entities if one accepts that consciousness is something that has developed and evolved.

Re:Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness by taxicabjesus on Saturday November 18, 2017 @01:22AM (#15727988)
> Dennet is a reductive materialist.

"Materialism: 1a: a theory that physical matter is the only or fundamental reality and that all being and processes and phenomena can be explained as manifestations or results of matter. scientific materialism" [1]

[1] https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/materialist

Materialism became the guiding philosophy of Science in ~1845. Reductionism was all the rage.

I think materialism is losing its stranglehold on scientific progress ('science advances one funeral at a time'). There was a submission a few days ago titled "physics has demoted mass" [3]

[3] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15679150

My experience is that the universe is probably more intricate than we can imagine.

Re:Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness by n4r9 on Saturday November 18, 2017 @04:24AM (#15728377)
That article is in no way an attack on materialism. Quantum chromodynamics still constitutes a materialist understanding of the universe. Are you perhaps confusing "matter" and "mass"?
Re:Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness by dwaltrip on Saturday November 18, 2017 @04:47PM (#15730885)
"Mass" is well defined. "Matter", less so.

https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-mass-an...

Re:Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness by taxicabjesus on Saturday November 18, 2017 @10:14AM (#15729231)
My point was that this old Philosophy is preventing progress. The stranglehold is most evident, to me, when self-appointed thought-leaders apply Materialism/Reductionism to medicine.
Re:Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness by n4r9 on Sunday November 19, 2017 @03:16AM (#15732863)
Do you have an example of what you're talking about?