Huh, I did not know that. Fascinating!
What I meant was that there have not been any disturbances that had widespread consequences; imagine that one day, out of nothing, it is impossible to get an answer for the .com zone, just for an hour or so. In my mind I see the news reporting about this the way they would report about a hurricane or earthquake. Unless a lot of their broadcasting / distribution also would be out of order. ;-)
The thing is, you have to maintain an attack for a long time to effectively disrupt service.
The root zone is published -- I imagine large recursive caches may use a local copy, rather than actually querying the root servers; but if they do query the root, the TTLs are 2 days; there's a pretty good chance your recursive resolver will have com. cached. The com. servers also give a 2 day TTL, so for popular domains, there's a good chance those are cached too. DDoS on the nameservers for domains can be effective, though. Even then, it's usually not a total outage.
[1] https://blog.thousandeyes.com/ddos-attack-varying-impacts-dn...
There have been _lots_ of large scale attacks on DNS infrastructure. DDoS against root servers, TLD servers, and well known nameservers is commonplace; occasionally with some success. Because DNS is mostly UDP, it works well with anycast, and anycast with many pops is a great way to handle traffic from a big DDoS. There's also a lot of good decisions in the protocol/general implementations that reduce the impact of outages.
DNSSEC is a bolt on intended to address response forgery, it doesn't address DDoS.