You either get security updates at the possible downside of sending more data to some database of a known vendor or you get the very possible risk of being part of a slide on DEFCON Fail Panel by some unknown blackhat.
I choose a known advesary over an unknown any day.
The modern non-technical but security-conscious person concedes that their devices are pwnt by (ie they are forced to trust) AppGoogAzon anyway, and simply shies away from trusting technology. The phenomenon is what it is - I'm not advocating for it, but advocating for understanding it.
Furthermore, are you saying that you actually know all the players in the commercial surveillance industry?!
I'd appeal to your same argument of known versus unknown, but point out that at least the motives of the rando blackhat are known. Whereas the surveillance industry will be innovating new ways of monetizing their malicious databases for the next century!
I don't know all the players in the. Surveillance industry but I'm not as paranoid to believe they are worse the. Black hats.
You probably also have little probability of knowing the actual intentions or motives, which actually helps little in threat mitigations.
It's true that drive by black hats could be looking to snarf up all the personal information they can, and selling it into the corporate surveillance databases. I just think it's less likely than they're looking for a quick hit to defraud some banks.
It's not a matter of "paranoia" (there we go again with the handwavey maligning subjectivity!), but of looking at the outcomes. It's paradoxical - the things we think of as "bad" really are not that worrisome, because the shared goal is to correct them. Meanwhile the things we think are "just the way it is" form an insidious creeping trend.
I have very little fear of say my bank account being drained, because if that actually were to happen, then we're in general agreement that it will be made right - from bank policy on up to common law. Whereas if my de-facto mandatory insurance rates mysteriously double, there is both little immediate recourse and many people will even argue in support based on the just world fallacy!
Binary Security is a sign you failed at security. You can be not secure at all, somewhat secure, etc, against a set of threat models or anywhere in between those steps.
Whether or not you have properly prepared against a threat model and you are confident in defending against it is a binary property (or rather, two binary properties) but the underlying security is not.
Likewise, my point about losing a datacap was that it was preferable to having more personal info backhauled into commercial surveillance databases. It's not an either-or and I'm not desiring either one - just calling attention to the larger context of user-security versus the myopia of marketing/corporate security.