If you really consider the issue closely, you'll see it depends on not overlooking certain dark corners of it which you can sort of ignore and assume to not contain contradictions—but they're there! And once you see them, it's hard to unsee them: what in the world would it mean for a desk to 'made' of mathematics—it's nonsensical. I think programmers are especially susceptible to this mistake because they're used to using mathematical descriptions to generate things, but even there, the idea that the math is doing any generating is a bias of our perspective since we're focused on the math; what's actually going on is a physical process involving silicon and plastic and metals etc., which can also be described mathematically, but the leap to being math is an unfounded step which could probably be predicted by the fact that that's where our focus lies.
It also begins to look kind of silly when you consider how human math is: it's an outgrowth of an evolved mental faculty. Cognition is certainly impressive relative to the other things we and various animals are able to do—but it's probably still in the same category of our other faculties like the olfactory, visual, tactile etc.—and unlikely to be involved in the literal fabrication of the universe.
What does it really mean to "exist" at all? It's equally undefined. This question is either problematic for every metaphysics, or none of them.
A desk is not "made" of mathematics any more than the words you're reading right now are "made" of electrons. What matters for existence is the relationships between mathematical structures. In this case, the relationship of your mind perceiving a desk is identical regardless of whether your mind and the desk are mathematical structures or some non-mathematical matter.
And once you accept that isomorphism, it's an easy step to a type of Platonism/mathematical monism because it's so unproblematic as a philosophy of mathematics. And once you're there, you have the mathematical universe.
Well, that's what Structuralism is (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structuralism_(philosophy_of_s... —but it would be running in circles to say that Structuralism is the correct approach here since it would only be the correct approach if the universe is in fact made of mathematics (in other words, it would be assuming your conclusion in your argument).
To be convincing, it's not necessary to claim that any particular position is definitely true, I should only need to demonstrate that said position solves open problems that have not or cannot be solved by other positions while being of comparable complexity, conceptually.
This is indeed the case for something like the mathematical universe over naturalism. There may yet be a comprehensive, unproblematic account for mathematics in naturalism, but we certainly don't have it yet. That's a huge, gaping wound in our fundamental knowledge.
The mathematical universe, by contrast, easily grounds mathematics and matter by encompassing both in the former.
The philosophical implications are far broader than that. The mathematical universe provides working foundations for a lot of philosophy and physics. For instance, the multiverse entailed by the mathematical universe explains why fine tuning for life isn't necessary.
> but I'll point out it's better not to pretend we have an answer if we really don't--then we keep looking.
You can keep looking despite accepting that the mathematical universe is currently our best explanation. Your implication that we wouldn't do this is simply bizarre. Would you shout equally loudly that we shouldn't build on our best scientific theory simply because it may not explain everything?
> The idea that reality is made of math as an answer is totally lacking in justification
Except I just covered the justification: the fact that it explains plenty of philosophical and scientific problems without introducing unnecessary complexity. What more justification could you possibly need?
Frankly, it sounds to me like you're either special pleading or moving the goalposts simply because you don't like the idea of the mathematical universe.
> I advocate an extreme “shut-up-and-calculate” approach to physics, where our external physical reality is assumed to be purely mathematical.
> Here, I will push this idea to its extreme and argue that our universe is not just described by mathematics — it is mathematics.
> Everything in our world is purely mathematical — including you.
Here's one mistake he makes: he doesn't account for qualia, the fact that people have subjectivity. Here is the one sentence where he glosses over it:
> In this example, the frog itself must consist of a thick bundle of pasta whose highly complex structure corresponds to particles that store and process information in a way that gives rise to the familiar sensation of self-awareness.
This is a pretty big assumption to make: processing something gives rise to sensations? Just because the processing is mathematically describable, is the sensation also? What would the mathematical description of the experience of a fever chill look like? And what about the 'system' that carries out the transition from process to sensation? Could it even be called a 'system' or is it more on the order of the fever chill itself?
Edit: I clarified a few things a couple minutes after posting.
> I'm don't think that is a sufficient argument to explain subjective experience,
—I have to agree with that, and I haven't seen anything which makes me think a better justification might be forthcoming (from anyone, not just Tegmark), so I kind of stop there.
My personal view on it is that qualia/subjectivity are just what it's like to actually be a thing ('on the inside' is kind of an approximate way of saying it). Considering the sorts of things that go on in human subjectivity (this time referring to objects appearing in it, not the medium itself), I suppose it is what it's like to be the part of the reality where a human brain is (actually I think it's only certain parts of human brains, probably related to executive function). In that case, I think a bunch of logic cates linked together in certain ways could end up having interesting 'internal aspects' (of course 'interesting' here is human-relative: who's to say the the parts of reality comprising trees aren't internally more interesting in some objective measure? (not that I think there is an objective measure for that.)
But I qualify the above as just how I guess that things are, not an assertion that it's really the case or anything.
Her more recent article (review of Max Tegmark's book) also comments on the same subject: http://backreaction.blogspot.in/2017/11/book-review-max-tegm...