> I advocate an extreme “shut-up-and-calculate” approach to physics, where our external physical reality is assumed to be purely mathematical.
> Here, I will push this idea to its extreme and argue that our universe is not just described by mathematics — it is mathematics.
> Everything in our world is purely mathematical — including you.
Here's one mistake he makes: he doesn't account for qualia, the fact that people have subjectivity. Here is the one sentence where he glosses over it:
> In this example, the frog itself must consist of a thick bundle of pasta whose highly complex structure corresponds to particles that store and process information in a way that gives rise to the familiar sensation of self-awareness.
This is a pretty big assumption to make: processing something gives rise to sensations? Just because the processing is mathematically describable, is the sensation also? What would the mathematical description of the experience of a fever chill look like? And what about the 'system' that carries out the transition from process to sensation? Could it even be called a 'system' or is it more on the order of the fever chill itself?
Edit: I clarified a few things a couple minutes after posting.
> I'm don't think that is a sufficient argument to explain subjective experience,
—I have to agree with that, and I haven't seen anything which makes me think a better justification might be forthcoming (from anyone, not just Tegmark), so I kind of stop there.
My personal view on it is that qualia/subjectivity are just what it's like to actually be a thing ('on the inside' is kind of an approximate way of saying it). Considering the sorts of things that go on in human subjectivity (this time referring to objects appearing in it, not the medium itself), I suppose it is what it's like to be the part of the reality where a human brain is (actually I think it's only certain parts of human brains, probably related to executive function). In that case, I think a bunch of logic cates linked together in certain ways could end up having interesting 'internal aspects' (of course 'interesting' here is human-relative: who's to say the the parts of reality comprising trees aren't internally more interesting in some objective measure? (not that I think there is an objective measure for that.)
But I qualify the above as just how I guess that things are, not an assertion that it's really the case or anything.