First, you say:
> It's about a belief that it's immoral to put someone under oath (to God) and pit himself against himself
and then you say
> It's about as close to a human right as you could find in that age
First, something being immoral doesn't imply that the opposite of it is a human right. Many people believe revenge is immoral but don't believe it to be a violation of their human rights. Not donating to charity might be immoral to many people but they wouldn't consider there to be a human right to take money from others. etc.
Second, we're not talking about English law either. These people were fleeing from English law and establishing their religious freedom. So it's fair to assume their biggest worry in the 5th amendment wasn't religion or God, but rather the government.
And third, your own source contradicts what you said. They clearly say courts relied on the the maxim (that “no man is bound to accuse himself”) as a protest against the unjust methods used to extract confessions. i.e., it wasn't that they viewed it as a human right in any sense, but that they began to invoke this maxim to avoid extracting forced (and hence potentially false) confessions. Which supports exactly what I said. (And note the use of "unjust" rather than "immoral" -- it's not about morality, but about administering justice. Religion and morality weren't new concepts then, and it's not like they avoided it initially due to moral reasons or suddenly avoided it due to feeling guilty.)
I don't have time to make a longer response to the rest of what you said, but the negative wording itself is further evidence that they were worried about government behavior and not trying to declare what is considered a fundamental human right (or trying to even "advisingly" prescribe good behavior for private individuals for that matter). I'm baffled at how you say things that align directly with this and then draw the opposite conclusions. If you're going to use the state constitutions as evidence, they're not going to be evidence for what the federal Constitution says. They can of course be evidence for what they themselves say, and nowhere do I argue that state constitutions do or don't declare anything as a fundamental right.
The 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Amendments were basically lifted directly from established English legislative and common law. That Americans were regularly denied the benefit of these laws was one of the primary grievances of the colonies, so they basically just copy+pasted them into the Bill of Rights.
As for the 1st amendment, I'm sure you've noticed that it's worded in the negative, and that's because the Bill of Rights originally only applied to the federal government. States were free to oppress speech and enforce religious laws. And that they did, and few thought those states inherently oppressive. At the time it was thought that such laws restricting speech, enforcing a state religion, etc, if chosen democratically, were tolerable. Protection from the tyranny of the majority hadn't yet become the predominate way to understand these newly declared individual rights. Rather, what most concerned the convention members was that the federal government not have the power to interfere with the democratic balance struck at the state level. Nonetheless, the wording of various state constitutions make it clear that freedom of speech, freedom of religion, etc were considered as much an individual right as any other.
It's useful to understand that our modern notion of free speech as one of our most inviolable rights is _very_ recent. Oddly, it's perhaps one of the most recent innovations in American constitutional law, succeeded only by criminal procedural rights like Miranda rights. Until circa 1930, when Brandeis and Holmes kicked-off a reconceptualization of free speech, the right to free speech was understood much as it's still understood in Europe--highly qualified and subject to reasonable, democratically chosen restrictions. Before the modern era, states regularly (and legally) jailed abolitionists, unionists, communists, and others, simply for speaking in public or passing out literature; and not because they lacked a license, but for the actual content of their speech.