And a group of biological neurons can?
I can agree that knowledge ultimately is grounded in sense experience ("the body"). Thus, the knowledge of "Horse" (or "Horseness") must ultimately be traced to sense experience involving particular horses.
I can agree that the "bits" in a computer (strictly speaking, not bits but physical states under that interpretation) are only meaningful by convention and not intrinsically. Thus, we say in one context that states labeled 11100 represent the integer 28 and a sequence of five Boolean values in another context, depending on the conventions of each context.
I can agree that conventional meanings are often cultural like commonly understood meanings of the symbolic which, again, lack that particular meaning intrinsically. E.g., both nodding and the utterance "yes" are generally meant to express agreement (except in countries like Bulgaria).
However, I do not understand what is being said when invoking embodiment and culture in this context, specifically.
I've always thought that the difference between knowledge (or knowing something) and being informed is when you can apply information gained in one realm to another.
This sort of assertion is experimentally untestable, not rigorously derivable from any axioms that people agree on, has no predictive power, and amounts to vague opinion passed off as fact. About a hundred years ago you might as well have been arguing about how "philosophically unsophisticated an idea like flying machines" was because flying is, strictly speaking, a behavior of flying animals.
How do we find out if they have semantics?
What do you think the definition of a computer is?
I really do wonder how many in the field of AI take as philosophically unsophisticated of an idea like intelligent computers seriously and see it as an obvious and uncontroversial possibility. What Hofstadter is dancing around is that intelligence requires semantics and semantics is exactly what computers, by definition, lack. Knowledge is semantic in nature and thus computers cannot, strictly speaking, know anything. They cannot reason because, again, reason requires semantics. Now, we are able to model and then formalize some domains of reality under some aspect well enough such that computers can behave in very useful ways, but no matter how sophisticated such programming gets, it cannot somehow magically cross over into semantics. The notion is patently absurd. So to say that AI is, literally, far from being intelligent is like saying the color red is far from being a strawberry. No amount of red will ever amount to a strawberry.
P.S. I was reminded of this post about Sphex wasps and intelligence, with mention of Dennett and Hofstadter: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/12/da-ya-think-im-sphex...