Re:Firefox Send: Private, Encrypted File Sharing
by idle_zealot on Wednesday October 11, 2017 @03:25PM
(#15452609)
This sounds a lot like Beaker [1], a browser based off on Dat [2]. It allows creation of shared resources (web pages) with immutable version tracking, among other things.
Re:Firefox Send: Private, Encrypted File Sharing
by the8472 on Wednesday October 11, 2017 @02:20PM
(#15451946)
This would also have the added bonus that one could reload such pinned resources from anywhere once you got the pin. Even without TLS setup or having to trust certificate chains.
Caching proxies would suddenly become viable again because only the first download has to through HTTPS while "I don't have this in the local cache anymore, can you serve me this content" requests could go through sidechannels or outside the TLS handshake or something like that. Caches could even perform downgrade non-attacks.
Re:Firefox Send: Private, Encrypted File Sharing
by Dylan16807 on Wednesday October 11, 2017 @04:11PM
(#15453016)
How many pins would you expect a browser instance to have? I feel like most of the time the pinned content could fit in the browser cache and make this variety of proxy-side caching pointless.
Re:Firefox Send: Private, Encrypted File Sharing
by the8472 on Wednesday October 11, 2017 @05:00PM
(#15453442)
Immutable content is a prerequisite for pins. The caching benefits mostly fall out of the immutability, not the pinning. So as long as the hypothetical standard would allow one to be used without the other additional uses could fall out of that stack.
Re:Firefox Send: Private, Encrypted File Sharing
by Dylan16807 on Wednesday October 11, 2017 @06:31PM
(#15454111)
My point is, those particular benefits only exist in a narrow circumstance where the browser is half-caching.
As a show of nothing-up-the-sleeve, a service asserts that it's in a stable state and will continue to serve exact copies of the resources as they exist now—that they will not change out from beneath the client in subsequent requests. When a user chooses to use resource pinning, the browser checks that this is true, and if finding a new deployment has occurred, the browser will refuse to accept it without deliberate consent and action from the user (something on par with invalid cert screen).
This means that for a subset of services (those whose business logic can run primarily on the client side), the users need not trust the server, they need only to trust the app, which can be audited.
When deploying updated resources, services SHOULD make the update well-advertised and accompany it with some notice out of band (such as a post about the new "release", its changelog, and a link to the repo), so the new deployment may be audited.
When new deployments occur, clients SHOULD allow the user to opt for continuing to using the pinned resources, and services SHOULD be implemented in such a way that this is handled gracefully. This gives the user continuity of access while the user (or their org) is carrying out the audit process.
Areas where this would be useful:
- HIPAA compliance
- Web crypto that isn't fundamentally broken
- Stronger guarantees for non-local resources used in Web Extensions—in fact, the entire extension update mechanism could probably be more or less rebased on top of the resource pinning policy