Basically we 100% agree with you that an authentication service should do this job. The HSM is extra credit. Although it does help in cases where the auth service's DB is leaked through some other means (e.g. backups).
I will say that I'd depart with you on the return value of that service. It shouldn't be a bool. It's better to return a token that downstream services can use to independently verify that the authentication service verified the user. Its better for your infrastructure if you aren't passing around direct user IDs but rather a cryptographically signed, short lived token that is only valid for the life of a specific request.
I agree that for the majority of usecases, a HSM is not necessary, but they do bring security to the table that a simple auth server cannot, at least not without significant engineering effort.
I'm only talking about the AuthN problem, by the way. I'm not making a general argument against circuit breaker architectures.
I think the idea of the author is to protect the operation with hardware.
"Hardware" isn't magic. The magic power of an HSM isn't the hardware; it's the minimalized attack surface of the software.
A Go, Rust, or (minimal, non-framework) Java authentication server speaking HTTPS to solely that AuthN interface and sharing no database with anything else is extremely unlikely to be part of any realistic "kill chain"; it'll be among the last things on your network compromised.
Meanwhile: you get to stick with technology you fully understand and can manage (simple HTTP application servers and a decent password hash) and monitor.
HSMs have a lot of uses elsewhere in secure architectures, but the password storage use case is overblown.