diogomonicapt
A Pirate's Take on Command vs. Leadership
Azure: https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/key-vault/ AWS: https://aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/
The only thing you're not able to do in a public cloud is run these in Secure Execution mode—where you get to actually execute arbitrary code inside of the enclave instead of just doing operations with keys that are protected by the HSMs.
Crypto Anchors: Exfiltration Resistant Infrastructure
Why you shouldn't use ENV variables for secret data
Or think about you exec'ing imagemagik and now the process running potentially adversarial code also has access to your parent's env.
Or think about an application crashing and doing an unintentional core dump to disk.
- If you have access to the managers, you have access to all the secrets (and access to administer the whole cluster), but normal swarm nodes only have access to the secrets required to run services that will be scheduled on them. Also this are erased as soon as the service is deleted or rescheduled on some other node.
- Exposing secrets as in-memory files has a lot of advantages over ENV variables (harder to leak).
- We already started updating a few images (MySQL, for example), so they can use Docker secrets.
- Definitely not DDC only, but note that RBAC over secrets is a feature of the commercial product.
Building it a second time was interesting. One of the biggest reasons why Keywhiz didn't go anywhere was the fact that it is incredibly hard to setup, and requires you to bring your own PKI. This time we didn't make that mistake and integrated directly into Swarm, which is the right place for it to live, and turns setting up your own PKI into a one-liner.
Anyway, AMA.
Disclosure: I work on the Docker Security team
Why should hard be secure enough? Information and non-invertibility
Hitless TLS Certificate Rotation in Go
Build once run where? Migrating my blog to hyper.sh
Increasing Attacker Cost Using Immutable Infrastructure
For the security enthusiasts out there, Docker 1.10 comes with some really cool Security focused additions. In particular:
- Seccomp filtering: you can now use bpf to filter exactly what system calls the processes inside of your containers can use.
- Default Seccomp Profile: Using the newly added Seccomp filtering capabilities we added a default Seccomp profile that will help keep reduce the surface exposed by your kernel. For example, last month's use-after-free vuln in join_session_keyring was blocked by our current default profile.
- User Namespaces: root inside of the container isn't root outside of the container (opt-in, for now).
- Authorization Plugins: you can now write plugins for allowing or denying API requests to the daemon. For example, you could block anyone from using --privileged.
- Content Addressed Images: The new manifest format in Docker 1.10 is a full Merkle DAG, and all the downloaded content is finally content addressable.
- Support for TUF Delegations: Docker now has support for read/write TUF delegations, and as soon as notary 0.2 comes out, you will be able to use delegations to provide signing capabilities to a team of developers with no shared keys.
These are just a few of the things we've been working on, and we think these are super cool.
Checkout more details here: http://blog.docker.com/2016/02/docker-engine-1-10-security/ or me know if you have any questions.
The article did stem from me reading blogposts where people were interpreting the XKCD comic into: just chose four words instead of one password.
Apple's TouchID is a great example of a frictionless authentication mechanism that can be easily augmented with a password to achieve two different factors, but the reality is that isn't a lot of that out there yet.