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diogomonicapt

Re:Crypto Anchors: Exfiltration Resistant Infrastructure on Monday October 09, 2017 @12:30PM (#15435251)
Don't disagree; I think what I actually tried to argue for was doing both: segregate data access to a new, minimal, service that also requires a key in an HSM to operate.
Re:Crypto Anchors: Exfiltration Resistant Infrastructure on Monday October 09, 2017 @11:52AM (#15434890)
You can definitely do this in public cloud HSMs.

Azure: https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/key-vault/ AWS: https://aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/

The only thing you're not able to do in a public cloud is run these in Secure Execution mode—where you get to actually execute arbitrary code inside of the enclave instead of just doing operations with keys that are protected by the HSMs.

Re:Introducing Docker Secrets Management on Thursday February 09, 2017 @11:33PM (#13613249)
My unstated assumption was that when calling something like imagetragick you would be doing the appropriate privilege dropping using setuid and setgid. This is obviously not necessarily the case, but it's at least a lot more common than people cleaning up the ENV before creating a child process.
Re:Introducing Docker Secrets Management on Thursday February 09, 2017 @04:32PM (#13611181)
The problem is applications unintentionally leaking the ENV. Think a hoptoad exception that attaches the current ENV to the report that sends up to the remote server.

Or think about you exec'ing imagemagik and now the process running potentially adversarial code also has access to your parent's env.

Or think about an application crashing and doing an unintentional core dump to disk.

Re:Introducing Docker Secrets Management on Thursday February 09, 2017 @02:31PM (#13610070)
Way better than I could have answered ;)
Re:Introducing Docker Secrets Management on Thursday February 09, 2017 @01:43PM (#13609599)
We explicitly chose not to support secrets as ENV variables, since they are prone to being leaked (child processes inhering parent's env; easy to leak ps -e; bug reports usually include ENV of the application; core dumps include ENV of the application, etc etc)
Re:Introducing Docker Secrets Management on Thursday February 09, 2017 @01:38PM (#13609550)
- We're working on external store support. First implementation will probably be w/ Vault, but we would love for this to come from the community.

- If you have access to the managers, you have access to all the secrets (and access to administer the whole cluster), but normal swarm nodes only have access to the secrets required to run services that will be scheduled on them. Also this are erased as soon as the service is deleted or rescheduled on some other node.

Re:Introducing Docker Secrets Management on Thursday February 09, 2017 @01:36PM (#13609526)
Exactly. The new version of compose supports defining docker secrets inside of the compose file.
Re:Introducing Docker Secrets Management on Thursday February 09, 2017 @01:34PM (#13609507)
Thanks!

- Exposing secrets as in-memory files has a lot of advantages over ENV variables (harder to leak).

- We already started updating a few images (MySQL, for example), so they can use Docker secrets.

- Definitely not DDC only, but note that RBAC over secrets is a feature of the commercial product.

Re:Introducing Docker Secrets Management on Thursday February 09, 2017 @01:31PM (#13609477)
You can make a PCI compliant installation w/ Docker yes.
Re:Introducing Docker Secrets Management on Thursday February 09, 2017 @12:17PM (#13608664)
I think with this release things have come full circle for me. I was part of the team that 5 years ago built Keywhiz at Square, starting the whole "secrets should be files exposed as an in-memory filesystem" thing.

Building it a second time was interesting. One of the biggest reasons why Keywhiz didn't go anywhere was the fact that it is incredibly hard to setup, and requires you to bring your own PKI. This time we didn't make that mistake and integrated directly into Swarm, which is the right place for it to live, and turns setting up your own PKI into a one-liner.

Anyway, AMA.

Disclosure: I work on the Docker Security team

Re:Hitless TLS Certificate Rotation in Go on Wednesday January 11, 2017 @02:15PM (#13376632)
Author here, I actually added a footnote exactly because of that fact: https://diogomonica.com/2017/01/11/hitless-tls-certificate-r...
Re:Docker 1.10.0 is out on Thursday February 04, 2016 @06:51PM (#11038229)
Disclaimer: I work for Docker

For the security enthusiasts out there, Docker 1.10 comes with some really cool Security focused additions. In particular:

- Seccomp filtering: you can now use bpf to filter exactly what system calls the processes inside of your containers can use.

- Default Seccomp Profile: Using the newly added Seccomp filtering capabilities we added a default Seccomp profile that will help keep reduce the surface exposed by your kernel. For example, last month's use-after-free vuln in join_session_keyring was blocked by our current default profile.

- User Namespaces: root inside of the container isn't root outside of the container (opt-in, for now).

- Authorization Plugins: you can now write plugins for allowing or denying API requests to the daemon. For example, you could block anyone from using --privileged.

- Content Addressed Images: The new manifest format in Docker 1.10 is a full Merkle DAG, and all the downloaded content is finally content addressable.

- Support for TUF Delegations: Docker now has support for read/write TUF delegations, and as soon as notary 0.2 comes out, you will be able to use delegations to provide signing capabilities to a team of developers with no shared keys.

These are just a few of the things we've been working on, and we think these are super cool.

Checkout more details here: http://blog.docker.com/2016/02/docker-engine-1-10-security/ or me know if you have any questions.

I agree that the title is more link-baity than it should. For what it's worth, part of it was just a witty title.
Agreed.

The article did stem from me reading blogposts where people were interpreting the XKCD comic into: just chose four words instead of one password.

I think the answer is not yet.

Apple's TouchID is a great example of a frictionless authentication mechanism that can be easily augmented with a password to achieve two different factors, but the reality is that isn't a lot of that out there yet.

Sorry man, no product.