They could also kick you out. I've done this a few times today. We reserved a number of team names for known tech companies, and when they've asked, I've created the team myself, added a couple of their managers as `owner`s, and then they've booted me.
You can think of the team's sigchain as just a string of signed announcements. You can sign someone else in as owner.
I think this demonstrates the problem of creating completely new namespace from scratch. One way to solve that would be to couple the team namespace to DNS namespace; to claim a team name you'd need to demonstrate the control of corresponding DNS name, same way as you do for DV certificates. Of course I can understand that you'd want to support teams for organizations/groups that might not have their own domains, but you could support such cases by creating a "pseudo-TLD" (or just straight up buy your own TLD), for example .keybase.
The one thing that worries me with this sort of thing is the "oops, I typo'd" something factor.
If I understand keybase correctly, if somebody were to say deploy some malware on my computer, thereby getting both my password and one device key, they would be able to completely take over my account, revoking each other key, and I'd have no way of getting my account back.
Obviously if somebody gets a device key, they would get access to all data, but is there any way to prevent the above from happening? So I could revoke the compromised key(s) and setup anew. Aside from manually having somebody at keybase do so.
We have already written a number of internal bots at Keybase. We have one that posts all our github commits into a channel, for example.
Edit: Additionally, are team names private? Can they be discovered without guessing them? If you guess one, can you prove it exists?
But if you picked a team name with very high entropy, then I guess that would be semi-private in that it would be undiscoverable by brute force.
(1) switching to short-term exploding message mode (what you would expect from OTR), so your messages can be read and then disappear. And devices don't cache them. This has inconveniences, especially for team chat, but it's what you might want in certain sensitive situations or certain DM's.
(2) a message auto-deletion policy for the team. This is different, and it's been requested by some testers.
+1 – use case for us is sending creds between team members/with clients/etc that we don't want to share permanently via 1PW/other vaults.
This really is an exciting product for us. Once you can define a team, cryptographically, without server trust, a lot of other things follow. We'll be launching some of those things in the coming weeks.
Also left out from the blog post: teams (and chats) can be controlled through a local API, so pretty much everything in Keybase can run in the form of a bot, also without trusting Keybase servers. Cheers to crypto!