However besides that...just curious: Will Chrome honor a header to disable HSTS for preloaded domains? (e.g. Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=0)? And what is going to happen if I submit my .dev site for removal from https://hstspreload.org/ ?
Also, reading the rules on hstspreload.org, I see the following statement: "Don't request inclusion unless you're sure that you can support HTTPS for your entire site and all its subdomains the long term"
Since you cannot actually guarantee that every .dev site will support HTTPS considering the fact that many developers use it on their LAN...don't you think you're breaking the rules here and possibly causing more problems than solutions?
My understanding is that HSTS carveouts are supported by Chrome but not yet other browsers. There's more standardization work to be done there. That said, you can only request entries on the HSTS list for domains that you own, and since no one (yet?) owns any .dev domain names, no one could request such changes. It goes without saying why you can only change security settings for domain names that you own.
And for the last question: Again, there are no .dev domain names. There never have been. It's never been available for registration. The recommendation for a long time has been to only use either (a) domain names that you actually own, or (b) domain names that are reserved for testing and are guaranteed never to exist a la RFC 2606. Using domain names for testing that don't yet exist but could in the future is a huge security hole that you must fix now. Do it now while the domain names still fail to resolve. Once they resolve, and you don't own them, then your security situation gets a lot worse.
It is, however, in widespread practical use.
> The recommendation for a long time has been to only use either (a) domain names that you actually own, or (b) domain names that are reserved for testing and are guaranteed never to exist a la RFC 2606
If taken to its extreme, that recommendation would mean that any kind of internal hostnames - even dotless ones - are subject to potential override unless they are tied to a public DNS entry.
* http://jdebp.eu./FGA/web-fully-qualified-domain-name.html
Would that I had recorded the case some while back where, when I pointed this out, someone chimed in to note that xe had worked for a company that had actually taken advantage of this in order to usurp external WWW sites.
And then there was WPAD.
* http://jdebp.eu./FGA/web-browser-auto-proxy-configuration.ht...
This is not taking things to an extreme. This is reality right now and has been for many years.
I disagree that this is something that Google needs to do on my behalf. If a cybersquatter squats on <my-startup>.dev, I don't consider it broken if I can't access their squat page. If I'm overriding random domains without doing my due diligence, then I get what I deserve (and probably wanted the results anyways). If somebody is spoofing a domain as a method of cyber attacking, the domain owner should have had HSTS if they had dignificant digital assets and they would already be using a non .dev domain.
I mean, that is exactly what is happening here, so it sounds like you get it. We aren't doing things on other people's behalf; HSTS is part of our plans.
The intention when registering such a domain name would be to follow said requirements, otherwise you wouldn't be able to use the domain name for hosting websites (though you could of course still use it for other services).
I.e., could you actually use your own certificate for a .dev site or would the browser only accept Google's?
Well, many people think that current TLS is too complicated and in part that discussion led to TLS 1.3. While I'm still not entirely happy with the complexity, it is far less complex than TLS 1.2.
TLS 1.3 removes a lot of the options that 1.2 had.
More broadly, I think it's worth incurring some inconvenience for the sake of security. Go too far in the other direction and you end up like Equifax.
But you can't exactly just skip it (witness Equifax).
Forcing security at multiple levels and making HTTPS easier is the way forward.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698
Not really an alternative to HTTP+TLS, but possibly another way of doing it depending on how it's implemented.
Since it appears that .dev is a Google internal TLD, would you consider not forcing that rule outside of Google? Effectively, we're getting all the stick and none of the carrot.
Alternately, announce your plans for .dev so as to bring some transparency to the process OR purchase maybe the .vm TLD and mark it for developer local testing in place of/addition to .localhost.
You should not be using globally delegated TLDs for local testing. See RFC 2606. I don't see how using .localhost or .test is any more of an inconvenience than using .dev. Indeed it is less of an inconvenience because it will work without DNS shenanigans.
The last round of gTLD expansion occurred in 2012 and there's still many years left until a potential future round. Additionally, .vm is not a valid gTLD because all two letter combinations are reserved for ccTLDs (countries).
And I would love to have some plans to announce. Maybe soon.
It's like complaining that you're using appname.ycombinatordev.com as a development suffix, then someone registers it and all your stuff breaks, and you want them to fix your problem.
It isn't good practice to use random domains or TLDs that you don't own for testing. At work we have a separate publicly-registered domain, and an internal subdomain with NS records on the primary publicly-registered domain that resolves separately. It's never been a problem..
I'd be less unhappy about this if web browsers (and application updaters) understood x509 ca cert limits, so you could tell a device to trust the lan cache to impersonate Debian.org, windowsupdate.com and BBC.com - but not Gmail.com...
For example, I see that .dev has a DS record in the root. But nic.dev is not signed.
But to pre-emptively answer the most likely question: We see HTTPS everywhere as being fundamental to improving security of the Web. Ideally all websites everywhere would use HTTPS, but there's decades of inertia of that not being the case. HSTS is one tool to help nudge things towards an HTTPS everywhere future, which has really only become possible in the last few years thanks to the likes of Let's Encrypt.