And agree that Troy's description is best as it takes us away from unhelpful metaphors.
If you believe your fingerprint data has been compromised, can you change your fingerprint data?
Yep. I can use another finger. If all 10 have been compromised you probably have bigger issues.
Or you just turn it off.
I'm usually let them tell their tale (out of my room, of course), ask a lot of questions, nod with them happily, and in the end I say thanks, but I'm sorry, I don't disclose my info, full stop. Their butthurt is sometimes too cool to watch without popcorn.
If I am who I say I am I should be able to answer all three without much thinking and answer naturally to my name.
[1]: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/08/10/htc_caught_storing_f...
1) lifted it off some surface. 2) got the right fingerprint when they did it 3) modeled a fake fingerprint well enough that it would fool touchID 4) Was able to get access to your touchID device while you weren't aware or unable to stop them
Most experts recommend that you instead use a pin-code of at least 6 numbers, or a password of at least 12 random characters using at least one number, and at one punctuation mark. In that case the attacker's algorithm changes to
1) Check for posted note containing password on computer monitor, or 2) Check purse or wallet for posted note containing passcode
It's not too difficult to get access to the full 50000-odd combinations (see https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587 for where that number comes from) Apple hardware can identify with a little work.
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/30/hacker-fa...
Implementation matters more than what the sensor is authing with.
Like, say, middle - index - ring.
It would be doubly unique.
biometrics make poor passwords.
Because security that people use is >> security people won't use
You can't change them, therefor they make poor secrets.
And the hassle of entering even a 4 digit numeric PIN was what Apple was trying to overcome.
Too many people were leaving their phones completely unlocked all the time.
2. Using passwords as a security measure increases the likelihood that a malicious actor will beat them out of you with a five-dollar wrench (and this does not mean that passwords are a bad idea).
The psychological detachment required to cut off a finger significantly lowers the number of criminals that will unlock your phone against your will.
So I'm pretty confident now that this argument is moot by now.
Yet we still don't have enough mileage to determine if face peeling will be a more likely issue with iPhoneX. But I could bet that "face offing" relatively is not more likely than finger cutting...
Cutting off someones finger to access their phone is like using high explosives to blow up a door you can easily kick open. Criminals actually don't want to get caught.
When the bolt cutters come out they are in. Sue me.
username • password
public • private
detachable • non-detachable
unique • arbitrary
A name has to be unique. But it can simultaneously be used as a password if it is impossible to detach (copy) it and associate with another thing. One way to do it is to simply hide it like private keys and normal passwords but in this case it cannot be used as a name. An alternative approach is to make it difficult to copy/reproduce (similar to normal car or house keys). In the case of fingerprints, they can well be used as a password (in addition to its role as a name) until it is impossible to create artificial fingers and attach them to other persons.[1] - https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/technology/fingerprint-se...
This is a much more pragmatic take on it by Troy Hunt, the person behind “Have I been pwned?”: https://www.troyhunt.com/face-id-touch-id-pins-no-id-and-pra...
> The first point I'll make here as I begin talking about the 3 main security constructs available is that they're all differently secure.