As for closing gaps, do we really expect science to be able to explain everything in terms of some fundamental theory, from quarks to societies? Or maybe in terms of emerging complexity going from chemistry all the way up to social organization?
Certainly consciousness appears to be subjective experience. That doesn't make it so. See: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00...
> As for closing gaps, do we really expect science to be able to explain everything in terms of some fundamental theory, from quarks to societies?
That certainly seems to be the trend. Every step forward in some field sheds light on other fields, and cross-disciplinary work is becoming ever more relevant.
That's an intriguing article, but it doesn't quite go far enough. It never really explains the experience of red or the smell of a rose, it just posits an attention model for having conscious awareness. It leaves the notion of qualia untouched.
Similar criticisms of Dennett have been made. But it does look promising. What needs to happens is an accompanying mechanistic explanation for the color experience itself.
Baby steps! Consciousness is an onion we'll have to peel apart one layer at a time.
There is no experiment we can construct which will tell us if a particular physical system experiences consciousness, be that a computer, a human brain, or a seemingly inert rock.
Only if you assume the conclusion in thinking consciousness is magic by making first-person subjective experience some irreducible fact of reality.
Your exact same argument would apply to "living matter" too. What distinguishes living matter from non-living matter? Some philosophers made a big stink about how living matter cannot be created from non-living matter, and they invented philosophies to address this question, like vitalism. Where is vitalism now? The same thing will happen with dualistic philosophies of mind.
If experience is irreducible, then something else is. In physics, that would probably be fields. Irreducible doesn't mean magic. It means we can't find anything to reduce it to.