Chalmers argument is that all physical explanations leave out consciousness, therefore a p-zombie world is logically possible. You just have a physical world that's lacking consciousness.
Keep in mind that Chalmers is a property dualist who thinks there is some additional law of nature binding consciousness with informationally rich physical processes (not necessary brain activity).
Re:The Hardening of Consciousness
by mannykannot on Wednesday September 13, 2017 @08:07PM
(#15243899)
Yet this article and others seem to be suggesting that the purpose of p-zombies is to argue against physicalism. It looks rather circular to me, though I am sure it isn't that obviously so.
It is, because if there can be a world that's physically identical, but lacks consciousness, then consciousness is not physical. Law of identity plus the necessity of physicalism demonstrate this.
The p-zombie argument isn't circular, but it can be attacked on other grounds.
Physicalism is also inherently a circular argument. It really gets to the root of philosophy and metaphysics, which is that at some point you reach the firmest axioms and base assumptions that can be reasonably supported by evidence and still there is nothing stopping you from—like a 3-year-old— asking "why?" just one more time.
Re:The Hardening of Consciousness
by mannykannot on Thursday September 14, 2017 @08:46AM
(#15247369)
Insofar as either position is an assertion of certainty, that's very plausible.
Has anyone seen a good argument that p-zombies are logically possible, that goes beyond being some form of "I can string these words together, and they form a grammatically-correct sentence?"