The following part of this classic (2009) article caught my eye:
> Symantec’s CTO Mark Bregman was recently advised by "three-letter agencies in the US Government" to use separate laptop and mobile device when traveling to China, citing potential hardware-based compromise.
It is strange how much this changed after the Snowden relevations. In Europe, now you get that same advice when travelling to the US.
Even US companies advise their overseas employees to be careful and thoughtful as to what you bring with you, b/c of what can happen at the border: https://github.com/basecamp/handbook/blob/master/internation...
[1] https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/10/meet-...
The tinfoil hats would have loved to say "told you so", but even they had not predicted the true scale of things.
Intel ME is not just some BIOS code, but a separate hardware component that is deeply connected with all CPU actions.
Real tinfoilers have been warning about this since the 80's
It's definitely possible to build a full virtualization environment that feels pretty seamless, but that was only a portion of the claim.
As speakers can be used as microphones (technology is essentially the same just different ohms and materials used for the cone) and modern motherboards can detect when a 3.5mm jack plug is plugged into a headphone socket, it might be possible to have the speakers acting as a microphone in some situations. Its something I'm still looking into, but I have noticed the some DJ mixes on Youtube will play up ie going quiet when you have headphone's plugged in but not when using built in speakers like those found on a laptop. You can reset the mix going quiet by unplugging the 3.5mm stereo jack, now whether this is some sort of DRM technology being used as some of the DJ mixes will be illegal copies uploaded to Youtube, I dont know yet just like I dont know if these are related or separate events to BadBios. Its not unheard of big corps to employ methods to disrupt illegal copies of music & films, the Sony rootkit on some of their music CD's is one such example of big corporations hacking their customers. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_BMG_copy_protection_rootk...
But don't you need something on the other side to receive and decode the data being sent? What's the BadBIOS story for how the infection initially happened?
(Is the assertion that something along the lines of Intel ME is already listening for control instructions over ultrasound?)
From there, it's turtles all the way down; you "only" need to deliver an ulterior, possibly tailored, payload from any of the several methods described in this thread.
OK, makes sense
>looks and feels like the real thing
Not really, because you can't turn off virtualization
To be clear what I mean is, the bios can be made to look and feel like the real bios when in fact it could be a compromised bios which still shows the manufacturers logo, menu options etc etc.
Bottom line is, if someone can make it, someone can modify it.
Only getting a SOIC clip hooked up to something like a RaspberryPi to get a copy of the chip code will you possibly be able to tell otherwise. Something like this might get people pointed in the right direction. http://www.win-raid.com/t58f16-Guide-Recover-from-failed-BIO...
One of the other attributes I have seen with this "suite of malware" is its ability to spread over the USB bus. If hit with it and it stops your usb devices including printers, mouse & keyboard, PS/2 mouse and keyboards still work so you can safely shutdown your machines instead of pressing and holding the power button to force a shutdown which can lose work. Lets face it, when looking at how USB works, its a disaster waiting to be exploited when considering how much attention goes into monitoring ethernet traffic. Having spoken with Tomasz the developer of this tool http://desowin.org/usbpcap/ on windows, you only get what windows will show you, so a separate malicious OS using CPU virtualisation could still interfere with the USB bus.
One file I've isolated when using partedmagic will not display its entire contents in the included opensource hex editor if its accessed using the hex editors file load method, but if you read the block device sector by sector, you can navigate to where the suspect file is stored and then read the entire contents of the suspect file. There seems to be a sort of magic string which prevents further investigation of suspect files including the ability to dd dev zero block devices which is a nuisance.
In all, who ever is behind this is IMO hacking chips so that even if you do a full disk wipe to whatever standard and reinstall the OS, you'll never get rid of it unless you reprogram the chips, it like a complex zero day spread over hardware and software, so in isolation parts look innocent enough but when combined becomes malicious. Its very very clever whoever is behind it and theres not many entities with the resources or knowledge to pull something like this off IMO.
Plus when considering the NDA's that exist with chip/cpu/hardware manufacturers, the knowledge at this level is even more restricted.
If you want to get lucky, dont always follow industry standard practices, its sometimes the only way to spot the anomalies.
But the theory is written into real programs by humans, who make mistakes. The math is unassailable until, oops, it isn't, because someone forgot a bounds check!
This whole "move fast and break things" philosophy should be unacceptable, if you want people to trust in your new cryptocurrency/voting machine/etc, but try telling your investors that it'll take 5 years to develop the software instead of 5 weeks to "a first prototype" whose bugs and bad design decisions will haunt you forever...
2) Extraction is not the only approach to verifying software with Coq (see Verifiable C, or Bedrock). In other proof assistants, e.g., in Isabelle or HOL extraction isn't even available and so other approaches are common. For a nice example look at the bootstrapping process of CakeML (https://cakeml.org/).
3) Even if it wasn't, the point is that the trusted base with verified software is tiny compared to anything else that people are actually using. "It's not perfect" is not an excuse if it is basically perfect in practice. See the Csmith paper ("Finding and Understanding Bugs in C Compilers", https://embed.cs.utah.edu/csmith/) and what they had to say about CompCert.
Suppose you are a medium-sized IT company (large enough to be a valuable target, but not google-large where you can employ a really good security team that knows their hardware in an out). And then think of all the hardware you buy from all different vendors and manufacturers, and make a list of those that could totally own you if there was a backdoor. What can you even do except shudder in horror?
While technically true, yet, you are comparing air travel safety with motorbike safety.
Doesn't matter on windows. The binaries are authenticode signed.
That's one of the reasons I'm skeptical of the Ethereum smart-contract concept. In theory it works, but in practice I'm not sure at all. The DAO heist was one early example of security bugs in smart contracts, but I fear they will become more common when malware developers turn to "contract-engineering".
[1] https://superuser.com/questions/301646/linux-keylogger-witho...
[2] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/10/evil_maid_att...