You certainly have more experience with this than the vast majority of the rest of us, but with that kind of data on millions of people, shouldn't it be, and why isn't it, standard practice to put servers storing that data behind an extremely limited API, with a firewall in place to monitor queries and responses and severely rate-limit or stop additional traffic if something suspicious happens, until the monitoring people can take a look?
Those with data on Equifax's servers aren't Equifax's customers, so other than "not having a PR cluster&#@_" economic incentives are not aligned to prevent this.
Also... even with multiple layers, what do you think the backend stack would be? Unless it's built by a separate team deliberately using a different technology platform, you're stuck with the same Struts (or whatever) vulnerability.
The system/network I inherited at new job it absolutely would be, it won't be in a year though.
We aren't a fortune 500 but there are simple, practical things you can do to limit the damage an RCE on a webserver can actually do.
But I disagree, security teams can and should manage large networks with large numbers of stakeholders.
If they can, why don't they?
Insufficient incentives, either caused by inadequate regulation or a belief the regulation won't be enforced.Think of the standards of network security and software validation used by, say, a Certificate Authority to keep their root certificates safe. Or by Google to secure GMail. Equifax just hasn't made reaching that standard their highest priority.
:)
Google would be most people's exception to the rule I'm talking about here, having as they do one of the world's greatest information security teams. And Google has had major incidents!
What's needed is an architectural security review, which is even rarer than people conducting an annual pentest.
You're too optimistic :(
I'm not saying you should like the tradeoff, or that the existence of the tradeoff doesn't have implications for how we should regulate banks and credit ratings agencies. I'm just saying that if you think there's some other CRA that has reliably protected its IT assets from threats like this, you're wrong.
this seems like goalpost moving. first you said 'we as a society', yet there isn't much 'we' in this. it doesn't seem to me that people (the general public) are properly aware at just how vulnerable they are. they haven't therefore 'decided' that this is okay.
> the expense that would go in to making a large enterprise network reliably secure would be extreme, and would drive prices up, retard economic growth
what is this based on?
To more directly answer your question, though, consider a regime of general commercial liability for security incidents caused by failures of engineering (which Equifax is an example of). What would it be like to bring new products to market under such a regime? How much more difficult would it be to enter the field? How much more difficult to hire qualified people? What would that do to the prices of things made possible largely through software engineering work? When the prices of things increase, they're put out of reach of more consumers; markets constrict. What does that do for employment? What does reduced employment in a sector do to wages?
I'm not saying this to justify insecurity. I'm ambivalent about the tradeoffs our society has made on these issues. I just don't think we tend to grapple with them honestly on HN.
My point is: the most savvy companies contract annual sitewide pentests, in addition to all the other stuff they do to secure their networks, and virtually all of those pentests "succeed" (from the perspective of the testers).
Further: not only have I never personally been on an internal network pentest (the kind where you start with an IP "behind the firewall" and nothing else) that failed, but I'm not sure I've even ever heard of one that failed. I'm certain there are some networks that are so resilient that they've stymied a competent internal pentest --- but again, I wouldn't know which one, because I've never heard of that happening.
Your car kills people? Your biscuits are mouldy, or full of lead? We have strict rules, and companies that don't follow then end up in serious trouble.
And they aren't perfect. They will eventually screw something up.
Comparing Stripe to Equifax is unreasonable. Equifax has about 10,000 employees. Stripe has less than 1,000.
And, once again, please don't try to win an argument by putting me in the position of defending Equifax. That's not what I'm doing. My point is that practically every company of Equifax's size has similar problems.
Apple, Facebook and Google have far more data under their control than Equifax and they seem to take security far more seriously than Equifax. The Apple InfoSec team is extremely aggressive — InfoSec is ingrained in Apple culture. I am skeptical that Equifax takes security as seriously.
Being “big” or “other large companies have the same problem” isn’t an excuse. They have no problem fucking people’s credit by reporting inaccurate information — they should be held accountable since that information has such severe consequences.
My hatred of Equifax runs deep because they reported 7 state tax liens on my credit report that weren’t mine and were from a state in which I never lived. Despite providing all kinds of documentation, I ultimately had to sue them. I won the case and a bit of money, but the point is, they were willing to have a team of lawyers go to court against me and tie it up in court for several years — to defend something they knew was wrong. I even had letters from the state tax agency attesting to the error and they still had to be sued to fix the information. If their IT security is as arrogant as the rest of the company, then this breach doesn’t surprise me.
How is that relevant? It’s highly relevant because they have demonstrated a willful disregard for facts. They demonstrate an arrogance based on their near-monopoly power over people’s lives. They don’t care about accuracy — they care about the appearance of accuracy. It follows that they aren’t good stewards of the information with which they have been trusted.
The fact that they are too big and IT security is “hard” — that’s an excuse. General Motors might have bad IT security (I don’t know,) but they also don’t control the financial lives of almost every American.
If they are so big that they can’t handle it, then they ought to be shut down.
To be clear, I don’t have a problem with credit reporting. I have a problem with the fact that Equifax is going to survive this. Some big judgement happens, they’ll file for bankruptcy, they’ll reorganize and be right back at it.
Apple is great. I like Apple's product security team and I like Apple IS&T. But so what? I'm not denying that there are 10-20 firms in the world that have world-class security teams. I'm denying that those teams are in any sense an industry norm, even in the technology industry.
Agree, and it's one of the reasons I generally try to avoid using products that are low-cost or free (the other reason being questionable sustainability, regardless of funding). At some point, products need to break even or they will go out of business. As a customer, you are always paying for the product in some form or another. For something that's free, you might be paying with your personal information now... or later if running on a low budget has caused the product developer to cut some corners when it comes to infosec.
That doesn't mean we should be letting Equifax off the hook. But nobody should pretend that RCE on an on-prem webserver wouldn't be game-over, for the entire internal network, across the majority of the Fortune 100.
We have as a society chosen to trade the security of our personal information for greater and cheaper access to products and services. Nobody on HN will like that fact (at least, as stated bluntly like that; plenty of them do like the increase to their earnings capability that results from that tradeoff), but it's generally true.