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Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by mevile on Saturday September 09, 2017 @11:54AM (#15207632)
The problem is that Equifax put within webserver's reach information that had no business being there. Apache Strut's vulnerability is unfortunate, but it shouldn't have been the keys to the kingdom, where the kingdom is the personal information of nearly the entire US adult population with a credit history. If I knew a service relied only on the security of a web server to protect deeply personal information such as my name and SSN I'd never sign up. We didn't have that choice with Equifax.

Having said that, definitely keep up on the vulnerabilities of software you use. It's hard though, especially when you're relying on a great deal of dependencies. A company the size of Equifax should have had a team dedicated to this. A team. It doesn't seem like they had anyone who knew anything about basic security at all.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tptacek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @12:17PM (#15207717)
This is a problem, yes, but I think it's worth keeping the perspective that it's a practically universal problem.

That doesn't mean we should be letting Equifax off the hook. But nobody should pretend that RCE on an on-prem webserver wouldn't be game-over, for the entire internal network, across the majority of the Fortune 100.

We have as a society chosen to trade the security of our personal information for greater and cheaper access to products and services. Nobody on HN will like that fact (at least, as stated bluntly like that; plenty of them do like the increase to their earnings capability that results from that tradeoff), but it's generally true.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by harshreality on Saturday September 09, 2017 @01:51PM (#15208211)
> But nobody should pretend that RCE on an on-prem webserver wouldn't be game-over, for the entire internal network, across the majority of the Fortune 100.

You certainly have more experience with this than the vast majority of the rest of us, but with that kind of data on millions of people, shouldn't it be, and why isn't it, standard practice to put servers storing that data behind an extremely limited API, with a firewall in place to monitor queries and responses and severely rate-limit or stop additional traffic if something suspicious happens, until the monitoring people can take a look?

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tptacek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @01:53PM (#15208225)
Because that not only adds operational expense but also requires engineering teams to have a level of systems engineering expertise and diligence that virtually no line-of-business software project has.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by ethbro on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:19PM (#15208382)
*adds operational expense without a counterparty willing to pay for that expense

Those with data on Equifax's servers aren't Equifax's customers, so other than "not having a PR cluster&#@_" economic incentives are not aligned to prevent this.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by sillysaurus3 on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:27PM (#15208439)
It's probably best to treat Equifax specially rather than making an example out of them for the rest of the industry to follow.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by concede_pluto on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:48PM (#15208555)
If they aren't qualified to design with least privilege, what are they qualified for, beyond maybe cat videos?
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tptacek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:01PM (#15208615)
I've spent about half my professional career finding vulnerabilities in the software of developers who are convinced they're "qualified to design with least privilege".
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by pacaro on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:31PM (#15208467)
And, even if you know what you are doing, this is intrinsically a hard problem, you need to know exactly what information should be accessible to each server
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by stickfigure on Saturday September 09, 2017 @06:03PM (#15209391)
You can add all the security layers you want, but if the web server needs to display a piece of information, the web server must have access to that information. The keys must be in the car somewhere.

Also... even with multiple layers, what do you think the backend stack would be? Unless it's built by a separate team deliberately using a different technology platform, you're stuck with the same Struts (or whatever) vulnerability.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by noir_lord on Saturday September 09, 2017 @01:09PM (#15207949)
> But nobody should pretend that RCE on an on-prem webserver wouldn't be game-over,

The system/network I inherited at new job it absolutely would be, it won't be in a year though.

We aren't a fortune 500 but there are simple, practical things you can do to limit the damage an RCE on a webserver can actually do.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tptacek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @01:14PM (#15207978)
Everybody can lock down a small network. Empirically, very few security teams can manage that for large networks with large numbers of stakeholders.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by chris_wot on Saturday September 09, 2017 @01:41PM (#15208140)
Then systems of governance are utterly broken and management should step in to enforce remedial actions, ASAP.

But I disagree, security teams can and should manage large networks with large numbers of stakeholders.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tptacek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @01:52PM (#15208219)
If they can, why don't they? How many annual site-wide pentests have you heard of that failed hard? And those are the people savvy enough to conduct annual site-wide pentests!
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by michaelt on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:16PM (#15208683)

  If they can, why don't they?
Insufficient incentives, either caused by inadequate regulation or a belief the regulation won't be enforced.

Think of the standards of network security and software validation used by, say, a Certificate Authority to keep their root certificates safe. Or by Google to secure GMail. Equifax just hasn't made reaching that standard their highest priority.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tptacek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:42PM (#15208836)
Certificate authorities to keep their root certificate keys safe... hmm... do go on.

:)

Google would be most people's exception to the rule I'm talking about here, having as they do one of the world's greatest information security teams. And Google has had major incidents!

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by extrapickles on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:22PM (#15208411)
A common pentest isn't geared towards discovering architectural weaknesses like all Americans PII is one popped webserver away from disclosure.

What's needed is an architectural security review, which is even rarer than people conducting an annual pentest.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tptacek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:32PM (#15208471)
What's your point? I'm saying, sitewide pentests almost always succeed.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by chris_wot on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:09PM (#15208648)
So they keep going till they fail?
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by wglb on Saturday September 09, 2017 @05:03PM (#15209140)
The target for most network pen tests is to obtain domain by noon of the first day. Generally, they keep going until they succeed and/or someone in the chain cries uncle.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tptacek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:42PM (#15208838)
I don't understand your question. When I say a pentest succeeds, I mean that the testers succeeded in compromising their objective.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by pas on Sunday September 10, 2017 @09:19AM (#15212100)
Parent post is saying that that should constitute a failed audit. And it should be repeated as long as a 2 week effort by a pentesting team yields results.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by chris_wot on Sunday September 10, 2017 @06:48PM (#15214709)
So they plug the security holes, arrange a new pentest.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by lomnakkus on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:28PM (#15208445)
> Everybody can lock down a small network.

You're too optimistic :(

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by justicezyx on Saturday September 09, 2017 @01:03PM (#15207922)
You claim that you keep my data safe. You missed it. It's not a trade off, it's a failure on your part...
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tptacek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @01:13PM (#15207973)
It very much is a trade-off, because the expense that would go in to making a large enterprise network reliably secure would be extreme, and would drive prices up, retard economic growth, and most likely result in software engineers making substantially less money.

I'm not saying you should like the tradeoff, or that the existence of the tradeoff doesn't have implications for how we should regulate banks and credit ratings agencies. I'm just saying that if you think there's some other CRA that has reliably protected its IT assets from threats like this, you're wrong.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by abiox on Saturday September 09, 2017 @01:32PM (#15208090)
> It very much is a trade-off

this seems like goalpost moving. first you said 'we as a society', yet there isn't much 'we' in this. it doesn't seem to me that people (the general public) are properly aware at just how vulnerable they are. they haven't therefore 'decided' that this is okay.

> the expense that would go in to making a large enterprise network reliably secure would be extreme, and would drive prices up, retard economic growth

what is this based on?

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tptacek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @01:36PM (#15208110)
Part of living in a society is recognizing that you still belong to it even when it makes decisions you don't agree with.

To more directly answer your question, though, consider a regime of general commercial liability for security incidents caused by failures of engineering (which Equifax is an example of). What would it be like to bring new products to market under such a regime? How much more difficult would it be to enter the field? How much more difficult to hire qualified people? What would that do to the prices of things made possible largely through software engineering work? When the prices of things increase, they're put out of reach of more consumers; markets constrict. What does that do for employment? What does reduced employment in a sector do to wages?

I'm not saying this to justify insecurity. I'm ambivalent about the tradeoffs our society has made on these issues. I just don't think we tend to grapple with them honestly on HN.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by chris_wot on Saturday September 09, 2017 @01:45PM (#15208168)
If that new product exposes scads of private data, then it's rather irrelevant. These credit scores aren't something most people signed up for, they are a product for financial lenders and not for the direct consumer.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tptacek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @01:54PM (#15208227)
Like I said, the fact of the tradeoff probably does have implications for how we regulate companies like Equifax.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by Drdrdrq on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:40PM (#15208508)
Sorry, I have to disagree. Performing regular pen testing is costly, so skiping it is a tradeoff. Employing a team of security engineers is also costly and there aren't enough of them to make that viable for all companies. Tradeoff. But putting such data in direct access of a web server, a single RCE away from exposure? That's not a tradeoff, that's negligence.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tptacek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:02PM (#15208619)
You've lost me. I think you may have misunderstood my point about pentests. I mean "success" from the perspective of the testers: you asked me to own your network up, and I succeeded.

My point is: the most savvy companies contract annual sitewide pentests, in addition to all the other stuff they do to secure their networks, and virtually all of those pentests "succeed" (from the perspective of the testers).

Further: not only have I never personally been on an internal network pentest (the kind where you start with an IP "behind the firewall" and nothing else) that failed, but I'm not sure I've even ever heard of one that failed. I'm certain there are some networks that are so resilient that they've stymied a competent internal pentest --- but again, I wouldn't know which one, because I've never heard of that happening.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by CJefferson on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:07PM (#15208636)
We've dealt with this for hundreds of years.

Your car kills people? Your biscuits are mouldy, or full of lead? We have strict rules, and companies that don't follow then end up in serious trouble.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by briandear on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:42PM (#15208520)
Apple’s payments systems haven’t been breached, nor do I recall a breach of Stripe and I would bet my teeth that their security is far better and more proactive than Equifax — a company that’s entire business is based on data brokering. If they can’t handle the “cost” of correct security or, at the very least keeping dependencies updated, then they ought not be in business. If security makes it expensive, then perhaps there should be more competition? The credit bureaus have a near monopoly so they don’t have to be aggressive about security as a Stripe might need to be. That complacency and just general malfeasance means they ought to be sued out of existence. I bet any number of Silicon Valley startups have better security than Equifax — at far lower budgets. It isn’t a cost issue — it’s a competency one.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tptacek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:49PM (#15208556)
More of my former colleagues work on the Stripe security team than at any other firm (besides NCC, our acquirer). They do a great job. But Stripe is a tiny company with very few products and a unified development culture with a management team organized around bringing technology products to market.

And they aren't perfect. They will eventually screw something up.

Comparing Stripe to Equifax is unreasonable. Equifax has about 10,000 employees. Stripe has less than 1,000.

And, once again, please don't try to win an argument by putting me in the position of defending Equifax. That's not what I'm doing. My point is that practically every company of Equifax's size has similar problems.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by briandear on Saturday September 09, 2017 @06:20PM (#15209459)
If Equifax is too big to have their shit together, they ought not be allowed to store sensitive data. If this were a HIPAA situation, they’d be facing a statutory penalty of about $10,000 per record.

Apple, Facebook and Google have far more data under their control than Equifax and they seem to take security far more seriously than Equifax. The Apple InfoSec team is extremely aggressive — InfoSec is ingrained in Apple culture. I am skeptical that Equifax takes security as seriously.

Being “big” or “other large companies have the same problem” isn’t an excuse. They have no problem fucking people’s credit by reporting inaccurate information — they should be held accountable since that information has such severe consequences.

My hatred of Equifax runs deep because they reported 7 state tax liens on my credit report that weren’t mine and were from a state in which I never lived. Despite providing all kinds of documentation, I ultimately had to sue them. I won the case and a bit of money, but the point is, they were willing to have a team of lawyers go to court against me and tie it up in court for several years — to defend something they knew was wrong. I even had letters from the state tax agency attesting to the error and they still had to be sued to fix the information. If their IT security is as arrogant as the rest of the company, then this breach doesn’t surprise me.

How is that relevant? It’s highly relevant because they have demonstrated a willful disregard for facts. They demonstrate an arrogance based on their near-monopoly power over people’s lives. They don’t care about accuracy — they care about the appearance of accuracy. It follows that they aren’t good stewards of the information with which they have been trusted.

The fact that they are too big and IT security is “hard” — that’s an excuse. General Motors might have bad IT security (I don’t know,) but they also don’t control the financial lives of almost every American.

If they are so big that they can’t handle it, then they ought to be shut down.

To be clear, I don’t have a problem with credit reporting. I have a problem with the fact that Equifax is going to survive this. Some big judgement happens, they’ll file for bankruptcy, they’ll reorganize and be right back at it.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tptacek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @06:31PM (#15209496)
No, they would not. HIPAA providers have suffered mass breaches repeatedly in the past. HIPAA is so toothless large firms just set aside cash to pay the fines rather than invest millions to speculatively comply.

Apple is great. I like Apple's product security team and I like Apple IS&T. But so what? I'm not denying that there are 10-20 firms in the world that have world-class security teams. I'm denying that those teams are in any sense an industry norm, even in the technology industry.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by justicezyx on Saturday September 09, 2017 @05:32PM (#15209259)
I am not sure how can you justify the company's childish security practice.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tedmiston on Saturday September 09, 2017 @01:30PM (#15208075)
"Safe" is full of grey area, just like security isn't binary.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by bradleyankrom on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:21PM (#15208403)
> We have as a society chosen to trade the security of our personal information for greater and cheaper access to products and services.

Agree, and it's one of the reasons I generally try to avoid using products that are low-cost or free (the other reason being questionable sustainability, regardless of funding). At some point, products need to break even or they will go out of business. As a customer, you are always paying for the product in some form or another. For something that's free, you might be paying with your personal information now... or later if running on a low budget has caused the product developer to cut some corners when it comes to infosec.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by nodamage on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:50PM (#15208560)
Shouldn't we hold credit reporting agencies to a higher standard than the rest of the Fortune 100 though? After all, they store sensitive personal information about the vast majority of US adults.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tptacek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:00PM (#15208610)
Maybe? I've said that elsewhere on the thread. But I'm not sure. Every big company tends to hold all sorts of hugely sensitive information.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by swixmix on Saturday September 09, 2017 @12:35PM (#15207797)
This was a reaction to Quartz Media's (QM) article that made Apache Strut appear to be incompetent. [0]. QM updated the article. [1]. Equifax was vulnerable for at least two and half months, and database access wasn't detected. [2].

[0]: https://web.archive.org/web/20170908214344/https://qz.com/10...

[1]: https://qz.com/1073221/the-hackers-who-broke-into-equifax-ex...

[2]: https://baird.bluematrix.com/docs/pdf/dbf801ef-f20e-4d6f-91c...

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by jtakkala on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:06PM (#15208305)
I completely agree about having a dedicated team, and I'd expect a company of their nature to be at the forefront of security best practices.

I just checked some Equifax domains against SSL Labs, and while their Canadian site (https://www.econsumer.equifax.ca) scores an A-, it has no forward secrecy. I'm surprised to see a modern web server not supporting FS today. Worse, the main entry point to their Canadian site (http://www.consumer.equifax.ca) as indexed by Google does not redirect to a TLS enabled page, although they do seem to have a TLS endpoint for that domain -- but not sure how people are expected to get to it.

Edited to add: The first link is only accessible through a redirect by clicking on the "Get Started" button on their main Canadian site. Furthermore, even selecting Canada from the drop-down on https://www.equifax.com/personal/ redirects to the insecure non-TLS site.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by jlgaddis on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:22PM (#15208413)
The results of a scan of equifaxsecurity2017.com by Mozilla's "Observatory" do not inspire confidence either:

https://observatory.mozilla.org/analyze.html?host=equifaxsec...

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by FabHK on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:20PM (#15208394)
Wouldn't an extension like HTTPS Everywhere do it for you? (Provided you're savvy enough to have it installed; in other words, they should still put in that redirection...)

https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by jtakkala on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:20PM (#15208397)
I've got HTTPS Everywhere running and it doesn't appear to have a rule since I'm still hitting the non-TLS site.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by avip on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:31PM (#15208468)
My rule-of-thumb for assessing security mindset is STS header. Which they don't have. That tiny Norton secured icon does not make me extra confident.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tmp3001 on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:43PM (#15208526)
Equifax is in the business of selling this information to other companies. They are offering services, which allow banks and other institutions to check this information through web service interfaces. It is kind of a core functionality that this information is available through a web server. More old fashioned way would have been to expose this information through some obscure protocol, but I don't think that would make it any more secure.

Now a different thing is that should this information be available through a server that is accessible directly through the Internet (and I don't know if it was) or if they should require for example a dedicated VPN connection.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by upstarter on Saturday September 09, 2017 @01:57PM (#15208249)
> The problem is that Equifax put within webserver's reach information that had no business being there.

Can you please link to your preferred tutorials (or other sources) which explain how to set up the most secure server architecture, with regards to this story/subject, for those of us who would like to do a better job?

Thanks a lot!

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by sillysaurus3 on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:11PM (#15208344)
It doesn't really exist. You "can't" because some computer still needs access to the data.

You can do layered security, but how? Think about a customer service rep. They need access to ~everybody's data at a moment's notice because they're a CS rep. That's what they do. That means every CS rep machine has access to all the data.

I'm not sure this is solvable. SSN's are the problem, not the way that we store SSNs. They still need you to read off your SSN when you call in, so you can't just encrypt it.

Think about Equifax in particular. They're a credit bureau. Of course they need all the data available all the time -- that's what a credit bureau does. The question is, how would you partition the data so that a failure in one place wouldn't lead to exfiltrating all the data everywhere?

The trouble is, it wasn't just "they popped Struts and then ran an scp." Even if you partition the data, they popped Struts! They have RCE inside your network. It's absurdly easy to pivot from one machine to another in a given network. You keep a helpful ~/.bash_history file that says exactly what's important and where everything is installed. Stuff like this is why I argued for deleting it, since it was the #1 most helpful tool I had that helped me pivot inside a target network. But then you get people yelling about taking away their bash history.

You can imagine how terrible this problem becomes in practice. Nobody here gives a crap about Equifax; they just want their heads to roll. Unfortunately you'll be next on the chopping block because no one has solved these issues. As soon as the world goes crazy over the lack of security, it's game over for us all because it leads to a highly regulated world that won't be much safer.

See how resistant we all were to the mere mention of increasing security procedures: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14104156

I was snarky in that thread which certainly didn't help, but you have an uphill battle if you want to implement anything on a large scale.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by perlgeek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:57PM (#15208892)
> You can do layered security, but how? Think about a customer service rep. They need access to ~everybody's data at a moment's notice because they're a CS rep. That's what they do. That means every CS rep machine has access to all the data.

That is true. But you can observe that a typical CS rep accesses maybe 10 customer's data sets per hour. If they work 8 hours a day, 200 days a year, that's 16k customers they could leak per anno without arousing suspicion Maybe 60k if you allow a fudge factor of 4 to prevent false-positives from highly motivated CS reps.

But only if you monitor for this kind of thing. (And better yet, you should rate limit, and monitor).

Most security problems don't have perfect solutions, but they do have some solutions that get you 80% there. And if you invest in sufficiently many such 80% solutions, you get to a point where it's not economical for an attacker to continue hammering on your application.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by rfzabick on Monday September 11, 2017 @09:27AM (#15218315)
Monitoring for anomalous access patterns is a good idea.

It wouldn't have helped in the face of RCE in struts. RCE in struts would let the adversary scp off all the files that make up the database, for instance. This would completely bypass any application-level checks or monitoring.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by pbourke on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:57PM (#15208601)
At the very least, you could separate identity and data access and treat each person's data as a separate tenant.

The main data store that contains everyone's credit reports (high side), should have physical and network isolation from the public site (low side). Only copy from high side to low side when someone becomes a customer.

(disclaimer: IANA security expert, but the perfect is the enemy of the good)

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by perlgeek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:51PM (#15208869)
There is no one-size-fits-all solution, and probably no "most secure", but lots of people have thought about stuff like that. If you google for "software architecture for security" or such terms, you'll find some helpful material.

https://www.computer.org/cms/CYBSI/docs/Top-10-Flaws.pdf (PDF warning) might be an interesting start.

The principles below it aren't too hard though: encrypt data in transit and in rest, think hard about key management. Keep attack surface minimal. Validate at all layers where it makes sense (for example in a multi-tenant application, you should authorize access to a row by tenant both in the application layer, and use row-level security in the DB as second layer of defense). Make your assumptions explicit; write them down. If possible, write automated tests that check if they still hold up.

While the principles are not hard to understand, designing an application with them in mind can be quite a different beast, and keeping stuff secure as features and integrations creep in requires quite some dedication.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by jlgaddis on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:27PM (#15208437)
Step 1: Patch your shit.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by matchagaucho on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:29PM (#15208457)
We won't really know until Equifax releases the full RCA (root cause analysis).

The attack could be way more sophisticated and involve several hacks through the stack.

Injecting a JSON blob to the Struts REST deserializer that effectively results in executing payload code would indicate high investment in the attack.

The hacker(s) possibly had insider information. They possibly used social hacking techniques to acquire data decryption keys.

Given Equifax stores more than 143M records, the initial report would imply some sort of data segmentation limited the scope of damage. If the doors were wide open, why didn't the hackers take 100% of the records?

None of this excuses Equifax or removes liability (I've personally initiated a credit freeze and will likely need a LifeLock Plus account for the rest of my life thanks to this breach).

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by solomatov on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:12PM (#15208664)
>Injecting a JSON blob to the Struts REST deserializer that effectively results in executing payload code would indicate high investment in the attack.

Why does it indicate high investment? IMO it's similar to SQL injection attack. People, just take a look at points where complicated data can be deserialized and check whether adequate checks can be overcome.

As I see from their report here: https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-052 they use XStream to deserialize REST data. XStream is basically Java serialization/deserialization to XML instead of binary. As far as I remember from my experience of working with XStream, XStream can deserialize almost any object, even the ones which aren't serializable by default. It's quite trivial to go from here to execution of arbitrary code.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by matchagaucho on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:22PM (#15208728)
> It's quite trivial to go from here to execution of arbitrary code.

Code that does what? Dumps all environment vars? OK, maybe that produces a DB2 connection string. Refactor code, re-inject, does the connection work? OK. Refactor code, re-inject and dump all tables. etc...

This attack requires an iterative trial-and-error probing process, typically done behind a proxy for many weeks/months.

From Equifax's PR: "the unauthorized access occurred from mid-May through July 2017.".

That's a reasonable amount of time to probe all systems involved and develop sophisticated code.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by sasas on Saturday September 09, 2017 @08:17PM (#15209794)
The vulnerabilities have public proof of concept code. You literally get a shell on the machine. I wont link examples here, but they are east to find.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by solomatov on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:31PM (#15208771)
>This attack requires an iterative trial-and-error probing process, typically done behind a proxy for many weeks/months.

Of course this attack is quite laborious, but it doesn't require anything special or unique.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by tetha on Saturday September 09, 2017 @04:04PM (#15208916)
It requires human effort.

For most attackers, it is vastly more efficient to run automated sql/wordpress-vuln/ssh-user scanners dropping bitcoin miners and botnet nodes. Those require zero human effort and self-replicate. That gives you less publicity than a hundred million personal finance records, but it has a much higher success chance and a more reliable income.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by perlgeek on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:38PM (#15208809)
> Having said that, definitely keep up on the vulnerabilities of software you use. It's hard though, especially when you're relying on a great deal of dependencies. A company the size of Equifax should have had a team dedicated to this. A team. It doesn't seem like they had anyone who knew anything about basic security at all.

If you don't have a full team for this, another strategy is to rely on a vendor, and try to obtain as many dependencies as possible from this vendor. Of course, you still need a process for updating the vendor-supplied components as quickly as possible.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by smegel on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:01PM (#15208272)
Most transactional websites need access to the core customer database, otherwise they could not function. Just DMZing everything is not always possible.

Maybe segmentation is the only possible defence - customers A-C served out of this DB with a different stack to limit the damage.

But once they get in, they get in, right. Its just a matter of finding the next vulnerability.

As long as you are providing a rich customer experience, with the ability to generate reports based on historical information, you have risk.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by g051051 on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:01PM (#15208270)
I'd guess that it didn't rely on the security of a web server, but the entry point was the "thin end of the wedge" for probing and deploying more sophisticated attacks.

At some point, the front end of any web application has to go to the back end database to get information. So there's just no way to cleanly and completely isolate the front facing parts of an application from possible breach.

Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by deejaybog on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:28PM (#15208447)
There are definitely methods of limiting the damage of a front end being taken over. A proper threat modeling process was obviously never performed.
Re:Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach by bognition on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:45PM (#15208535)
This just isn't true. With proper controls and an internal authentication stack you absolutely can guard against an edge getting owned.