Would that more people in the US understood the difference.
In the Japanese writing system, candidate's name can be written in multiple ways. If writing doesn't match one of the exact registered candidates names, the human vote counter decides if it refer to the unambiguous candidate. If such candidate exists, it is counted to the voting for that candidate.
> There are multiple local party volunteers ...
Same.
Japan's literacy rate is very high, but it's not 100%.
How do they know that you actually cast the vote for you? Say my 5 best friends all tell me, "Nah, I'm not gonna vote. My vote doesn't count anyway." I then go to each of their districts, claim to be them by giving their name and address, and vote how I want. What's to stop that from happening?
Also you need to consider:
1) Those kinds of people are probably not registered to vote. Voter registration is not automatic in the UK. It takes 5 minutes with an online form, but some people are just that disengaged.
2) The 'wards' in which you vote are often quite small and in close proximity, so it might be a little hard to figure out which polling place your friends are registered at if you haven't received their polling notification card. You can get this information, but its a small barrier.
3) The 'wards' have an average population of a few thousand, so there is a risk that an official might recognise you as trying to double vote, but I can't imagine how they might confront if they aren't 100% personally certain.
None of those are strong guarantees. If evidence of wide spread fraud were to come to light, party policy ID requirements might change, but to date no party is seriously considering introducing them. Past governments have repeatedly tried to introduce a universal ID that could be used in part for voting ID, but each attempt has ended in failure due to public backlash over civil liberties concerns.
And even if you fully count both records, what happens when there is a discrepancy?
Computer and hand count does its own thing, and in the end the numbers should agree.
4% of the time it prints a different paper receipt, it just makes the electronic numbers go in someone's favor by a few percent in a couple choice districts. Or it uses crafty UX to make people vote for people or things they normally wouldn't.
And what if the numbers don't agree? Are you just going to pick one side? Are you going to hold a re-election? Will the re-election have the same turnout? Will people not go because their side won by a landslide before? Will some people change their mind because the media is reporting that side "X" is behind the discrepancy? Or will it just give side "Y" the few extra weeks they needed to campaign and win?
Cast the ballot on paper. Every ballot has unique counterfeit patterns (totally randomized). The ballot is scanned and send to server, with both the scan of the ballot and the eletronic reading. Voter should be asked to verify (but we know half don't do it). The paper ballot is casted the same way as it has always been. We can also read the paper ballot one more time if we have to during the first round of counting. You can't have a fraud unless you cab mainpluate both paper and eletronic. Either both come to same number or they don't. I am just not familiar with how we verify eligibility tbh.
When we count paper ballot, we scan for the counterfeit. If the final number has mismatched, we either have a miscount or an error. Paper ballot will alwsys get recount when there is dispute.
Have we had a re-election in the entire American history, or at least in the past 30 years? Regardless, paper ballot fraud can lead to reelection so regardless of what proposal we will face re-election if we have to, but we normally don't.
This seems like over engineering, but we have to take into account people living abroad almost always now rely on eletronic voting if EV is offered.
I am a novice on the whole voting system, but just off the top of head my proposal would seem to work in ideal situation. The fact we have a record of ubique vote electronically and on paper is cruical to the integrity of each vote. There must have been a few dozen studies already on this topic. I'd suprise if no one has a bullet proof system yet. It CAN'T be that hard. Just emulate cryptography here.
You don't need to mail anything anywhere in a paper vote, count by hand system.
> having a few people watching a locked box also has problem. The whole counting by hand also has problem.
What problem do they have?
> I'd suprise if no one has a bullet proof system yet.
We do have one: no electronics, count by hand in public view.
And requiring a large amount of manpower is a benefit of paper voting, not a problem. In the grand scheme of things it's a miniscule amount of work, and it ensures freedoms and laws for generations to come. This isn't an area where efficiency matters. The more manpower it takes, the harder it will be to "hack" it without being noticed.
That it is archaic, inefficient and a waste of human time?
We don't hold elections that often, nor do we need their results instantly. Voting with a pencil takes about as long as voting on a touchscreen. So why is there this stupid urge to optimise?
There are multiple local party volunteers (I was one in the last election) from all the major parties at all stages of the process watching the flow of paper ballots from the sealed black collection bins to the voting halls where local council officals that volunteered, with paltry compensation, to a 12-18 hour shift to collect and count the vote. Some local councils take pride in being amoung the first to report their results, and there is a side competition to see who reports first.
We usually know the broad outcome of the election by the early hours of the next morning, with a handful of recounts in tight races going into the next couple of days.