In theory the IFE and avionics are separated by firewalls. Some things like the PA system are often on the IFE side, and hacks for panasonic IFE have included impersonating the pilot announcements and stuff.

In practice I wouldn't expect the firewalls to be particularly well tested or complete or configured correctly, and it may be possible for an attacker to DOS the firewall and impact the other systems, and possible for the attacker to penetrate the firewall and so on.

Not really familiar with the Boeing architecture, but having worked on similar systems for other commercial aircraft, "firewall" is an understatement for the systems that act as gateways between the aircraft network domains with different criticality levels.

The IFE is in the Passenger Information and Entertainment Services Domain (as defined by the standard ARINC664 Aircraft Data Networks). A basic assumption regarding the connectivity to more sensitive domains is that PIESD is totally insecure and anything can happen.

Finally to people wondering why aircraft designers would physically connect networks with vastly different security requirements: it's for making it possible to share aircraft/ground communication means (satcom...)

I find this hard to believe. I always thought that IFE and avionics are on separate machines and run over different internal networks and wires. But I'm also not a Boeing engineer.

Can someone confirm the above post?

You or I would have completely different sets of wires.

Sadly, it seems they usually share wires and are separated by firewalls.

There's been lots of CCC and defcon talks about hacking in-flight systems. Googling "panasonic ife hack" gets plenty of hits, as does "Chris Roberts" who is a hacker who has made some pretty big claims about actually really hacking planes in flight and other stupid things. And there are articles like this https://www.wired.com/2015/04/hackers-commandeer-new-planes-... that talk about how the systems share wires.

I don't know anyone who believes those claims, which have become a kind of shared joke in the software security community.

Nobody in the office here (I work on IFE & avionics software) believes those claims either.

Roberts? Yes.

Shared wires? That's fact, right?

I'm simply commenting on the notion that any packet he sent an IFE caused the plane to literally, perceptibly move. I don't need or want to derive the probability of that having occurred from first principles.

I only have experience with smaller, general aviation aircraft (Turboprop, 8 seats) but the IFE is indeed connected to the same box that handles maintenance tools. The ipad we use to troubleshoot the engines is on the same wifi network that we use to watch videos.

Do you have source on panasonic IFE hacks? Sounds interesting.

(Its mentioned in the opening paragraph of the article ;) Its been a big thing for a long time and there are lots of articles you can google too.)

Doh! Thank you.

229 dead from an overheated entertainment system: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swissair_Flight_111

faulty wiring in the cockpit after the entertainment system started to overheat. electronic device don't start to do arc wiring with a portscan. Stop spreading bad info.

Even if in any other dimension it can be possible, it's the responsability of who design the system for protect against this.

Agree with the last line 100% - although the same argument can just as easily be applied to any and all systems in any and all arenas. The fact that the potential exists leaves a margin for error, and a window for trouble, which is what the post is about. If the potential for failure in a system is there, it needs to be addressed and the effects nullified or mitigated.

Nothing you do to the IFE is going to take down the plane.

I agree it's not likely, but there can be some rare cascading scenarios. Like pilots may update electronic flight bag data via an onboard network which is separate from the entertainment network...but shares bandwidth with the same satellite transciever/antenna. Your port scan hogs the bandwidth somehow, resulting in somewhat less fresh data for tarmac conditions, etc. It's not likely, but it's possible.

And it doesn't have to be a dramatic life threatening situation to incur a boatload of financial liability. See this for example: http://nypost.com/2017/08/30/unruly-passenger-ordered-to-pay...

The other reply regarding the overheated IFE is another unlikely, but possible, scenario.

So we're supposed to just take your word for it, in the face of contradictory evidence?

You don't have to go any further than the Wikipedia article the previous commenter provided to see that no evidence has been provided for how sending packets to an IFE could take down a plane.

Fair enough, but lack of evidence in this one case is not evidence that IFE systems are invincible. That's quite an extraordinary claim.

Hyperbole like this always makes me nervous. The probability is obviously not zero, politely suggesting the question: "what has been missed in this analysis?"

It shouldn't.