It took me a couple seconds to realize how utterly pessimistic that statement is.

I was discussing that with a friend once and I argued that a more intelligent species might fare worse in these matters. It would more rapidly and aggressively exploit its environment due to higher intelligence and would therefore run a greater risk of triggering catastrophic environmental events.

The problem is that there is no game theoretic advantage in cooperating to reduce CO2 unless everyone cooperates. If one large player (e.g. USA or China) or many small players do not cooperate then the incentive flips and it's actually in everyone's best interest to defect. If catastrophic climate change is going to happen anyway then you are better off burning as much CO2 as you want to build up your economy so you have a better chance of mitigating the damage. It's basically a variation on the prisoner's dilemma scenario.

I guess someone didn't like hearing what you said, but you're absolutely right. Global agreements are coordination problems; there's an incentive to violate them, discretely at least. And there's a cost to genuinely comply with the agreement while others are clandestinely violating it.