But when investment and retail banking merged, the stable system of incentives disintegrated. Before the merger, retail banking was more expensive, but it was incredibly stable; that premium was more than worth the cost. I don't see why investment banking needs to merge with retailing banking anymore than VC firms need to merge with retail banking. It just results in a chaotic system.
In an increasingly electronic age where the technical transactional costs are quickly eroding to nothing, you don't gain much efficiency by merging these roles. The remaining transactional costs are functional and specifically serve to ensure that incentives are well-aligned internally and externally. Removing those barriers merely permits people to extract all that value, diminishing the overall value of the systems and the economy in general.
Likewise, the global value of assets is so tremendous that investment firms don't need direct access to the capital within the retail banking sector. We're quickly approaching something like $100 trillion in highly liquid investments globally.
Exchange-traded options settle on a predictable window; there's no "if you knew" to it [1]. Also, the price goes wonky near expiries because that's when delta approaches one. Market makers switch from hedging with derivatives to hedging with spot; that means jitters.
Not saying there's no fraud. But pricing going wonky around a settlement event makes sense as everyone prepares for it.
[1] http://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/legal/service-gu...
Might actually be a reason for the exchange to fuzz the expiry (eg random time) but that has its own problems. People do have to look at the options as they expire for legitimate hedging reasons.
I suspect the swap traders were mostly targeting future delivery dates (4 fixings a year). That's the only way the fraction of basis points they were asking the submitters to move the fixing by would have any material P&L impact. So it's kind of like other markets with strandardised contracts.
The former manipulation would have affected every days fixings.
Single stock options tend to be settled with actual stock, and at least in Europe tend to be a lot less liquid. And there's other problems with trading them, like other people knowing a lot more than the market maker about what's happening. You also have pin risk which seems to be like a magnet.
Are you implying that, close to expiration, a large player would move the index, in order to move their option position in the money? In the case of ES, that would imply buying an impossibly large of amount of SP500 assets---which they would have to liquidate at some point after the ES settlement or liquidation...
Also not understanding your point on pin risk, pinning is the result of maintaining a delta neutral hedge, which is a well known strategy...
The thing is there are derivatives that are sometimes non-linear, things with triggers and barriers. When some large enough fish has one of these (eg by taking the other side vs a customer) they have an incentive to move the rate in whatever way they can. Whether it's getting someone to submit a bad rate or sitting on an FX cross, it can be worth it.
Before I went full quant I was often looking at the screens manually. You'd often see at around the WM/Reuters fix that the price would move strangely. An unusually large move would happen with no apparent news. You'd get a rumour from a broker, but who knew how they knew? And quite often the move would fade after the window closed.
This would happen even in exchange traded options. If you knew the specifics of the settlement window, you would know when the price would go wonky. You wouldn't know who, but you knew that is wasn't a normal time in the market.
The LIBOR was a bit less obvious, only really clear to me in hindsight. Swaps don't have a common schedule like listed options, so there's a fixing every day that could be in someone's interest to influence. Same goes for FX, but since LIBOR is a bunch of opinions (as opposed to trades) it's not as obvious.