There's a fine line between "can be verified by the government at any time who you voted for" and "can be forced to show proof of who you voted for" or even "if you don't publicly show your proof of who you voted for, you are on a list". not to mention the ability to "sell" your vote to whoever and have proof that you followed through.
In a truly "secret ballot" voting system, you should be incapable of proving who you voted for. You can still tell others who you voted for, but there shouldn't be any "proof".
But even still paper ballots where you check off a square and put it in a box can give the same assurances as that complicated Scantegrity system as long as you stick around and watch the ballot box yourself till it's counted. yes, it's a day of time, but it's something you or literally anyone else can do regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, social status, education, or anything else.
* The ballot gets mixed in with others * the bundle gets divided up (A cards go in 1 bundle, B cards go another) * taken to a vote counting location; * each bundle is then divide between ballot counting machines.
The whole point is that an individual ballot becomes untraceable before the counting actually starts.
When you're casting a vote on paper, it's pretty easy to check that your vote is not being observed.
When you're casting an electronic vote, you have no such option. You can claim the vote is secret. The developers of the voting machine can claim the vote is secret. But the voter has no way to verify this.
Secret voting is too important to be left to voting machines.
One thing I've been thinking about lately, is that while we all probably have better intuition for "protecting" our paper vote, I'm not convinced that the huge advances in monitoring technology, covert and generally available, hasn't to an extent invalidated this somewhat.
You really only need to be able to read some markings on paper (in IR, via some kind of fairly low resolution x-ray, what have you) - with the voter (eg: general camera surveillance showing a person entering a voting booth) - in order to monitor a vote. It's certainly much higher demand on manpower to do it, but I don't think it should be discounted - the payoff will be proportional to the power wielded by the public office being elected for.
So while I think "lets do electronic voting!" is a crazy blanked-statement to make in order to improve security, I don't think we should be so certain analog voting is as secure today, as it was in the 80s and earlier.
correct - the machines are vulnerable even if the paper is not.
How would the criminals know what the unique string would be for a particular vote?
In this case the coercer would just force the voter to give them their string after they vote. Now they could theoretically lie, but they'd have to be able to give a valid string that matches the preferred vote of the coercer, and that no one else has already given them. This is sufficiently hard to arrange that at least some people will not be able to do so.
Has anyone else tried this?